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"0 It" n y connec ... 
INTRODUCTION 
E.M. Forster, Howards End l 
For a hundred years, courts and regulators have assumed that when a 
telephone company terminates a call originating on another network, the 
originating company "uses" the terminating company's wire.2 Courts have 
determined, therefore, that companies terminating or accepting calls from 
other networks must receive compensation to avoid a taking of its private 
property.3 Consequently, when regulators mandate interconnection, they 
generally require payments between carriers, generically called intercarrier 
payments, to compensate such interconnection.4 
Mandated intercarrier payments have brought serious regulatory 
uncertainty to efforts to foster telecommunications competition-from the 
1914 Kingsbury Commitment, to MCl's entrance into long-distance in the 
1980s, to the Telecommunications Act of 1996's local telephony 
1. E.M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1948) (1921). 
2. See infra note 44. 
3. See infra Section I. 
4. This Article uses the tenn "intercarrier payments" to refer generically to all 
payments between carriers, including long-distance access charges, reciprocal compensation 
between local telephone companies under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and 
settlement charges in international calling. See In re Access Charge Refonn, 15 F.C.C.R. 
12,962, 12,965-70 (May 31, 2000) (explaining that the tenn "access charges" refers to the 
payments made by long-distance companies to local exchanges pursuant to their 
interconnection regime); 47 U.S.C. §§ 25I(c), 252(d) (2000) (describing local 
interconnection payments); In re In!'1 Settlement Rates, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,806, 19,806-07 
(Aug. 18, 1997) (describing the international settlement system for calling). 
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deregulation.5 Largely recovering costs in a manner different from the way 
they are incurred, intercarrier payments are inherently inefficient and, to a 
large degree, arbitrary, giving regulators broad powers to shape the market, 
thereby creating significant business uncertainty. Intercarrier payments 
continue to form one of the most controversial aspects of communications 
law. Even after two trips to the Supreme Court, it still has left open the 
question whether TELRIC (Total Element Long Range Incremental Cost), 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996's local intercarrier payment regime 
for unbundled network elements (UNEs), is an unconstitutional taking of 
property.6 This unending legal uncertainty perpetuates the stagnation 
endemic to the communications industry today. 
If the takings assumptions Were shown to be incorrect, if intercarrier 
payments are not the only way to deal with the costs interconnection 
imposes, then the legal need for intercarrier payments would disappear and 
a more competitively neutral, less regulatory regime could take their place, 
drastically changing the face of communications law and policyJ This 
Article argues that the takings/intercarrier payment assumption is, in fact, 
faulty. Interconnection does not necessarily involve one company "using" 
another's network in a manner requiring one network to pay the other. 
Indeed, such assertion is economically suspect because interconnection 
confers a benefit to both networks-that of a larger calling universe, i.e., 
network effects-which renders each network more valuable.8 Rather than 
5. As discussed below, efforts to introduce or foster competition had, as an essential 
feature, a government-imposed access charge regime. In the 1910s, the Kingsbury 
Commitment required independent phone companies to pay "tariffs" to interconnect with 
Bell-affiliated long-distance services. HARRY B. MACMEAL, THE STORY OF INDEPENDENT 
TELEPHONY 204-07 (1934) (reprinting the commitment and specifying the "connection 
charge of ten cents for each message which originates on its lines and is carried in whole or 
in part over the lines of the Bell system"). After the AT&T break-up, the Commission 
created the long-distance access charge regime, specifying the amounts that long-distance 
companies must pay originating and terminating local exchanges. In re MTS & W ATS 
Mkt.-Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (Feb. 28, 1983). The long-distance access charge regime 
served the dual purpose of "paying" for interconnection as well as maintaining the 
subsidization levels of local phone rates. GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY 
FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 173-94 (1994). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
deregulated local telephony, requires access charge payments between incumbent local Bell 
monopolies and new entrants (competitive local exchanges or CLECs). 47 U.S.C. §§ 
251(c)(2)(D),252(d)(2). 
6. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 527-28 (2002) (not 
definitively reaching the question of whether TELRIC constitutes a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
7. See infra Section III.B. 
8. See David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote 
Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 523, 524 (1999). Balto states: 
The value of a network to a consumer depends on the total number of users and 
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requiring networks to pay each other on a per call basis, interconnection 
regimes should only require payment of those costs incremental to 
establishing interconnection. Simple, quasi-Coasian (a term explained 
infra) interconnection regimes do that, by allocating costs of facilities 
incremental to interconnection between carriers, not trying to calculate the 
cost that a call from one network imposes on another.9 Once 
interconnection is established, telephone companies would exchange traffic 
without intercarrier compensation and recover the costs of their networks 
from end-users, just as bailers, telegraphs, e-mails, and, historically, most 
common carriers did. IO 
Implicitly adopting this understanding of network property rights, 
economists recently have proposed interconnection regimes (falling under 
the "bill and keep" rubric) that split the costs of interconnection in a 
competitively neutral manner, thereby producing an efficient, quasi-
Coasian result and that have no provision for intercarrier payments. II The 
FCC is currently considering these proposals. 12 This Article contends that 
the identities of other specific users. The larger the network, the greater the 
number of consumers who will join it and conversely, the smaller the network, the 
less attractive it will be to consumers. For example, a telephone network becomes 
more valuable as additional customers are connected to it. 
Id.; see infra note 232 and accompanying text. The locus classicus for network economics is 
probably Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities. Competition. and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985). 
9. See infra Section III.B. 
10. See infra Section 11.B. This proposal would arguably return telephony 
interconnection regimes to those used historically for other common carriers and network 
industries. Id. Under common law, common carriers must accept traffic from all, including 
competitors: telegraph companies could interconnect by sending their delivery boys to 
competitor companies, railroads unloaded freight and re-Ioaded it to connecting carriers, and 
phone companies at one time transmitted messages to non-interconnected companies by 
calling these company's central offices, which then called their customer, who then went to 
a phone belonging to the calling party's phone company-a convoluted, but common 
practice in the early 1900s. Id.; see infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text. Although 
this type of interconnection involves carriers accepting traffic from other carriers, it poses 
no takings issues because general, end-user rates compensated each company. 
11. JAY ATKINSON & CHRISTOPHER BARNEKOV, A COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL ApPROACH 
TO NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 7-16 (Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 
34, Dec. 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp34.pdf; Patrick 
DeGraba, Central Office Bill and Keep as a Unified Inter-Carrier Compensation Regime, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 37,40 (2002) [hereinafter DeGraba, Central Office Bill]; Patrick DeGraba, 
Efficient Inter-carrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the 
Value of a Call, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 207 (2003). See also infra Section III for 
discussion of quasi-Coasian interconnection regimes. 
12. In re Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compo Regime, 16 F.C.C.R. 16,822, 
16,822-23 (Sept. 19, 2001). As discussed infra, voice over internet protocol ("VoIP"), 
which threatens the entire long-distance access charge system by using the internet 
backbone to complete long distance calls, has brought great urgency to this proceeding. As 
HeinOnline -- 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 373 2004
2004] Network Interconnection and Takings 373 
such interconnection does not constitute a taking. Finally, this approach to 
interconnection undercuts to some degree the notion that mandatory 
interconnection must be compensated through the efficient component 
pricing rule, a notion frequently and prominently forwarded. 13 
Section I examines the origins of the belief that a phone company that 
terminates a call from another must receive compensation from the 
originating carrier to avoid a taking of private property. In the early part of 
this century, courts faced the problem of applying the traditional right of 
interconnection (which this Article terms the "right of hand-off')-that 
required ferries, railroads, telegraphs, and the like to receive traffic from 
competitors as well as members of the public-to the new technology of 
telephony. 14 Most common carriers, like railroads, or even telegraphs, 
could interconnect with competitors in the same manner as they received 
traffic from the public-ferries would deliver traffic to public docks where 
they would connect ("hand-off') with other ferries, railroads did the same 
at terminals and stations, and telegraphs could interconnect by sending 
delivery boys to competitors' offices. In marked contrast to these 
technologies, telephone companies posed an interconnection challenge 
because they required physical facilities (i.e., specially connected 
switchboards) to interconnect efficiently with competitors; simple hand-off 
of press time, industry is in negotiation over the future of intercarrier compensation. See 
NARUC Develops Proposals On Intercarrier Compensation, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REPORTS, Mar. 15,2004, available at 2004 WL 69682759 (describing the negotiations of 
the large carriers and the reaction of small, rural carriers). 
13. The ECPR rule is an often-advocated approach to pricing interconnection. See 
generally 1. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1997) [hereinafter SIDAK & SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND 
THE REGULATORY CONTRAcr]; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and 
Managed Competition in Network, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998) [hereinafter Sidak & 
Spulber, Deregulation]; Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the 
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak & 
Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons]; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, 
Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068 (1997) 
[hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Givings, Takings]; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, 
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 851,855 
(1996) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings]. It recently has been applied to 
the takings issue for mandatory interconnection. E.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. 
Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 
885,948 (2003). 
14. See infra Section 1.8.2; see also MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: 
COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
TELEPHONE SYSTEM 44-50 (1997). 
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interconnection was not feasible. IS 
Providing a thorough analysis of the telephone common law 
interconnection cases, Section I shows that these cases never really 
resolved this central challenge of telephone interconnection. A dominant 
approach-which most courts and commentators view as definitive-
attempted to resolve this problem by destroying the right and obligation of 
hand-off for telephone companies. 16 They reasoned because telephone 
interconnection required special facilities, such facilities' costs could not 
simply be imposed without involving a taking of private property.17 If 
regulators then mandated interconnection, this cost must be recovered 
through intercarrier payments. 18 This approach creates a de facto right-if 
no intercarrier payments are offered-to refuse interconnection, something 
totally new to common carriage. 19 
Courts were not unanimous in this conclusion. Some realized that by 
making competitors pay for the right to interconnect-rather than passing 
traffic along and having end-users bear the cost-they were destroying a 
basic right of common carriage enjoyed in other industries.2o Some of 
these courts stated that interconnection under certain circumstances was a 
right, but could never solve the puzzle of how to maintain the right of hand-
off without imposing costs on interconnecting carriers.21 Finally, a third 
approach required unconnected telephone companies to transmit messages 
by calling their central offices, which then called their customer, who then 
went to a phone belonging to the calling party's phone company.22 This 
pres.erved the right of hand-off and presented no takings issues but was 
hardly practical. 23 
Drawing on basic microeconomic pricing theory, Section II offers an 
insight to the puzzle. As the early cases established, "hand-off' 
interconnection does not present a takings problem.24 Why not? Such 
interconnection involves one network using another network and acquiring 
benefit from it, just as railroads that can interconnect with others can 
provide a more valuable service than they could individually.25 Similarly, 
15. See infra Section III. 
16. See infra Section I.B.2.a. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. See infra Section LB.2.b. 
21. [d. 
22. See infra Section LB.2.c. 
23. [d. 
24. See infra Section II.B. 
25. [d. 
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to use the language of modem takings law, it also involves a physical 
invasion, i.e. one phone company must accept on its physical property the 
telegraph or telephone lines of another. Why did not the early cases not 
find hand-off interconnection a taking? Section II argues that hand-off 
interconnection is not a taking because the rate charged to the public-
either to consumers or the interconnecting competitor-is designed to 
adequately recover all costs. In other words, if a common carrier wishes to 
stay in business, a rate will likely recover the incremental cost of the 
service provided and make some contribution to common costs.26 As a 
result, mandatory hand-off interconnection would not constitute a taking.27 
On the other hand, physical interconnection imposes new capital costs that 
a court cannot assume the general rate will recover. 28 Because an 
interconnecting carrier's rate may not be designed to recover these new 
fixed costs, the common law courts were right in presuming that physical 
interconnection without compensation may be a taking.29 
The key question is how interconnection's imposed costs, costs that 
may not be recovered in a network's existing general rate, may be 
compensated to avoid a taking.3o Intercarrier payments are one answer. 
They assume that telephone companies have no right to interconnection 
whatsoever and, therefore, if government mandates interconnection, the 
company requesting interconnection must compensate the interconnecting 
company for the cost that the call imposes on the terminating network. 31 
But, intercarrier payments' logic is contrary to traditional common carriage 
law. Why? Because under such law, once the originating carrier presented 
traffic to the terminating carrier, the originating carrier did not have to pay 
the terminator.32 Rather, the terminating carrier would recover the cost of 
the traffic from either the sender or recipient, not another carrier.33 
Intercarrier payments present intractable economic problems that have 
beset telecommunication regulation for a century.34 As discussed below, 
calculating the cost one network imposes on another is incredibly complex, 
and, due to the problem of allocating common costs, economic theory does 
not provide one correct answer.35 Lobbying, politicization, and agency-
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. !d. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. !d. 
35. See infra Section lILA. 
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capture further distort the calculation. As a result, intercarrier payments can 
never be non-controversially set. To illustrate these failings, three 
important conflicts in intercarrier payment regimes are reviewed: long-
distance access charges, the ISP reciprocal compensation dispute, and 
terminating access monopolies under the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.36 
Section III argues that there is another solution to the question of how 
to recover the costs of physical interconnection, which is currently under 
consideration by the FCC. Rather than assume that the originating carrier 
must pay for the cost imposed on the terminating network, assume that the 
originating carrier must only pay to get the call to the terminating carrier's 
network; just as a telegraph company must simply get the telegram to the 
interconnecting telegraph company's office.37 In other words, apply the 
forgotten right of hand-off, but compensate for the cost incremental to 
physical interconnection. Drawing on recent quasi-Coasian theories of 
interconnection, Section III points out that if parties negotiated on how to 
bear this cost, they would likely split it in some fashion because physical 
interconnection provides both firms with the benefit of a larger, 
interconnected network ("network effects") which are, on the whole, more 
valuable. Thus, carriers-regardless of which one has the "right to 
interconnection"-would interconnect without intercarrier compensation if 
the burden (cost) of interconnection were allocated between them so that its 
benefit outweighed its cost. The cost of a call would be recovered from 
end-users who would presumably pay for a more valuable, bigger, though 
more expensive network. As a result, because carriers would experience no 
economic damage from interconnection, the first step of any takings claim 
is never reached.38 Further, because carriers could recover the 
interconnection costs, both the cost of physical interconnection as well as 
the incremental cost of each call, from their own end-users, such 
interconnection regimes are not "confiscatory" under the takings standard 
applicable to utilities.39 
36. See infra Section III. 
37. !d. 
38. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) ("the general rule at least is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking"); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.l2, at 4 78-92 (6th ed. 2000). 
39. There is a distinct line of Supreme Court cases that deal specifically with regulated 
utilities. E.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Permian Basin Area 
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Mkt. St. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548 
(1945). As discussed below, these cases do not directly bear on the question of whether 
interconnection constitutes a taking in deregulated utilities markets but, as Section V 
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FinaIly, Section IV places this argument in its scholarly setting. 
Numerous academics, most notably Lawrence Lessig in his justly famous 
The Future of Ideas, have called for open access regimes for cable 
systems.40 They have not explained fully how to pay for it, a point which 
this Article argues is a central aspect of any interconnection regime. On 
the other hand, advocates of the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), 
most notably J. Gregory Sidak, Daniel F. Spulber, and now Christopher 
Y 00, have advocated for pricing access to include the cost of such access as 
well as the opportunity cost which deregulation eliminates, i.e., the revenue 
that incumbent monopolists would have received in the absence of 
competition.41 In Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional 
Connections, Spulber and Yoo argue that ECPR-based intercarrier 
payments are necessary constitutionally, if no market price exists, as 
compensation for mandatory interconnectionY This Article argues that 
Spulber and Y 00, in fact, identify both the wrong costs that interconnection 
imposes and the wrong parties to bear these costs, and therefore 
recommend a compensation regime that requires intercarrier payments (and 
their concomitant bureaucratic and economic intractability) that would 
incorrectly compensate the incumbent monopolists.43 On the other hand, 
quasi-Coasian interconnection satisfies constitutional requirements without 
intercarrier payments and their ineluctable intractability. 
I. COMMON LAW, COMMON CARRIAGE, AND COMMON 
MISCONCEPTIONS 
It is a hundred year old chestnut of communications law that 
mandatory interconnection is not a right under common law, and, as a 
corollary, regulators when mandating interconnection must also mandate 
intercarrier payments.44 Modern commentators assume this truth to be 
maintains, their approach provides the best guidance to the question of whether an 
interconnection requirement constitutes a taking. 
40. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 164-65 (2001). 
41. Spu1ber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 906; Sidak & Spulber, Deregulation, supra note 
13, at 129; Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 13, at 1087-90; 
Sidak & Spulber, Givings. Takings, supra note 13, at 1096-1101; Sidak & Spulber, 
Deregulatory Takings, supra note 13, at 980-87. 
42. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 958. 
43. See Section IV. 
44. Okla.-Ark. Tel. Co. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 45 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1930) ("It 
must further be conceded that, at common law, a telephone company owes no duty to make 
physical connections with other telephone companies."); Memphis Tel. Co. v. Cumberland 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 F. 835, 840 (6th Cir. 1916) ("[T]he making and maintenance of a 
connection between two telephone companies in the absence of a contract between them 
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almost self-evident.45 For instance, Sidak and Spulber, prolific writers in 
depends on statute."); Total Telecomms. Servs., Inc. v. AT&T, 919 F. Supp. 472, 479 
(D.D.C. 1996) ("[I]nterconnection is required only when the FCC so directs it .... "); 
Woodlands Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 447 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wright-Dickinson Hotel Co., 214 F. 666,670 (D.C. Or. 1914) (requiring 
interconnection with a charge of 3 1/3 cents per call, "[it] is not a taking of the plaintiff's 
property in any sense. It is but a reasonable regulation which is properly referable to the 
police power of the state."); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (D.C. Wash. 
1912) (stating that telephone companies at common law are "not bound to accord to any 
such outside organizations or its patrons connection with its switchboard on an equality with 
its own patrons .... ") ("All the authorities agree that at common law each telephone 
company is independent of all other telephone companies .... "); State ex reI. Fletcher v. 
N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 240 N.W. 252, 255 (Iowa 1932); Clay County Coop. Tel. Ass'n v. S.W. 
Bell Tel. Co., 190 P. 747, 749 (Kan. 1920) ("[T]here is no dispute that in the absence of 
statute, no telephone company is obliged to make an initial switchboard connection with any 
other."); Rural Home Tel. Co. v. Ky. & Ind. Tel. Co., 107 S.W. 787, 792 (Ky. 1908) (stating 
that interconnection is not required without a contract); Gilman v. Somerset Farmers' Coop. 
Tel. Co., 151 A. 440, 442 (Me. 1930); Oceana Farmers' Mut. Tel. Co. v. United Home Tel. 
Co., 172 N.W. 553, 556 (Mich. 1919); Mich. State Tel. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n, 161 
N.W. 240, 245 (Mich. 1916) ("It is for complainant to show affirmatively that the physical 
connection ordered by the commission will inflict upon it an undue loss and one that cannot 
be prevented by the contemplated adjustment of rates, tolls, and charges.");W. Buse Tel. Co. 
v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 248 N.W. 220,223 (Minn. 1933) ("[P]hysical connection between 
telephone companies cannot be compelled at common law."); Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie 
Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1911) ("The theory of the case ... is that under 
the law the Sarcoxie Company was compelled to grant physical connection to the Bell 
Company ... this contention is not well founded."); Home Tel. Co. v. Granby & Neosho 
Tel. Co., 126 S.W. 773, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910); Blackledge v. Farmers' Indep. Tel. Co. of 
Red Cloud, 181 N.W. 709, 710 (Neb. 1921) ("[B]y the common law, public utilities owed 
no duty beyond their existing lines, and, therefore, no obligation to make physical 
connections or exchange service with each other."); United States Tel. Co. v. Middlepoint 
Home Tel. Co., 19 Ohio Dec. 202, at *5 (Ohio Com. PI. 1908); Pioneer Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Grant County Rural Tel. Co., 119 P. 968, 973 (Okla. 1911) ("When a fair and just 
compensation is afforded for [interconnection]... that constitutional requirement 
[(takings)] is satisfied."); City of Milbank v. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co., 159 N.W. 99, 100 (S.D. 
1916) (stating that requiring interconnection is not a taking provided interconnection is 
made at the expense of carrier requesting it); Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 141 
S. W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 1911) (stating that common carriers do not have to carry calls of other 
telephone companies because there is a "difference between" carrying patron's calls and 
other telephone'S calls); State v. Skagit River Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 P. 885, 893 (Wash. 1915) 
(stating that mandatory interconnection is acceptable provided that the regulatory 
commission "provide for such reasonable joint rates or tolls .... "). 
45. E.g., James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 
FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 258 (2002) ("[T]he common law imposed no obligation on railroads 
(or other carriers) to interconnect with the lines of other carriers or to establish joint or 
through rates for services.. . . There was no obligation to establish either a physical 
connection or a joint business operation." (citing Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 196 F. at 703); Okla.-
Ark. Tel. Co., 45 F.2d at 995; State ex rei. Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 87 N.E. 644,664 (Ind. 
1909); see also Annotation, Right and Duty of Telephone Companies to Make Physical 
Connections of Exchanges or Lines, 11 A.L.R. 1204, 1204 (1921) ("The courts are agreed 
that at common law telephone companies ... are not subject to control and regulation to the 
extent of being under the duty of making physical connection with another company, in the 
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the area, state that it is "clear under the common law of common carriage 
that a public utilities could not be required to sell interconnection to 
another carrier.,,46 Similarly, Tom W. Bell claims that Peter Huber, the 
eminent communications lawyer and writer, "relies on suspect history" for 
claiming "mandatory interconnection [is] consistent with common law's 
common carrier doctrine.'047 
The old chestnut is soft in the center. As an initial matter, the common 
law of interconnection for telephones is hardly "clear" or "decisive" 
because there are, in fact, very few cases that ruled on the matter, and the 
issue was never completely resolved. The common law interconnection 
issue only became relevant after 1897 when the Bell patent expired and 
competitive telephony emerged.48 Starting around 1904, with South 
Carolina, states began to pass laws requiring interconnection, and in 1914, 
the Kingsbury Commitment mandated interconnection nationwide between 
the independents and AT&T, thereby putting an end to most common law 
development.49 While many view the question of common law 
interconnection as settled, the question never received extensive judicial 
treatments, nor did a consistent view on the matter emerge among the 
federal or state courts. 
More significantly, the chestnut is a deceptive simplification. To say 
that interconnection is not a common law right is wrong. As mentioned 
above, common carriage law always required a carrier to accept traffic 
from a competitor if presented in the same manner as other traffic.50 Thus, 
railroads and bailers had to receive traffic from other railroads and bailers 
if it were presented at a public station or terminal. 51 Further, no court ever 
questioned the simple right of interconnection, requiring unconnected 
carriers to transmit messages. Rather, as at least the early, contemporary 
commentators made clear, it was the right to special physical 
interconnection facilities that did not exist under common law.52 
absence of any statute requiring such physical connection."). 
46. Sidak & Spulber, Givings. Takings. supra note 13, at 1085. 
47. Tom W. Bell, Public Choice and Public Law: The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1759 (1999) (reviewing PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN 
CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997». 
48. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 43, 119 n.36. 
49. Id. at 119 n.36. 
50. See irifra notes 98 to 112; see also 1 BRUCE WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE 
CORPORATIONS §§ 514-15 (1911). 
51. See infra notes 98 to 112. 
52. S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 
COMPANIES § 263, at 362 (1916). Jones stated: 
The rules laid down elsewhere respecting the connection of lines do not make it 
the duty of one telephone company to connect with competing lines. The physical 
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First, this Section reviews common carrier law, as it developed in the 
nineteenth century for such industries as bailers, railroads, and telegraphs. 
In these industries, courts distinguished between the right to special 
interconnection facilities and the right of any customer-a member of the 
public or competitor-to hand-off traffic.53 These cases, including the 
Express Cases,54 which, it is often claimed, undermine the right to 
interconnection, do not give an absolute right to refuse interconnection with 
competitors.55 Rather, common carriers must receive traffic in their 
established interconnection points from members of the public as well as 
competi tors. 56 
Next, this Section examines how courts applied this earlier common 
carrier law to telephones. They took three general approaches. 57 First, 
courts, uncomfortable with imposing the costs of physical interconnection, 
ruled that it was not a right.58 Second, a small line of cases recognizes the 
right of long-distance companies to interconnect with local exchanges.59 
Third, many cases recognize that telephone companies, as common 
carriers, have the duty to transmit messages, albeit in a convoluted 
manner. 60 If one telephone company's subscriber wanted to reach a 
subscriber of a telephone company with which the first company was not 
connected, the calling party's operator would call an operator of the 
recipient's telephone company, and that operator would then call the 
recipient and instruct him or her to go to a public phone belonging to the 
calling party's company.61 
The Section concludes that the common law-far from establishing 
that interconnection is not a right and that, if mandated, requires intercarrier 
payments-never resolved basic questions about how common carriage 
connection between competing telephone companies is a privilege to be created 
only as a result of private contract, or in obedience to some constitutional or 
statutory provision. 
Id. (emphasis added); 2 OSCAR L. POND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES § 
554, at 1008-16 (4th rev. ed. 1932); 1 BRUCE WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS § 
525, at 447 (1911) ("One thing is as certain as anything can be at common law ... and that 
is that [common carriers] ... are under no obligation to ... make physical connection with 
another service."). 
53. See infra Section I.A. 
54. 117 U.S. 1 (1886). The Supreme Court consolidated three suits in one decision, 
known as the Express Cases. !d. at 2. 
55. See The Express Cases, 117 U.S. at 2. 
56. Id. at 28. 
57. See infra Section 1.8.2 
58. See infra notes 126-138 and accompanying text. 
59. See infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text. 
60. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
61. !d. 
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applies to telephone interconnection.62 Fundamentally, the cases never 
made clear why the costs of physical interconnection as well as the cost of 
transmitting the call on the terminating network must be borne by the 
originating carrier through intercarrier payments; as opposed to 
apportioning the cost of interconnection and requiring networks to recover 
costs from their end-users that "hand-off' interconnection involves.63 
The Section, therefore, questions a fundamental premise of 
communications law: that mandatory interconnection requires intercarrier 
payments in order to avoid a taking. As the Article's subsequent Sections 
argue, apportioning property rights in this fashion essentially awards a 
"termination monopoly" to each carrier, allowing it to demand tribute (in 
the form of intercarrier payments) from all other carriers that wish to 
contact its subscribers.64 Further, intercarrier payments, which recover 
fixed cost on a per minute basis, are inherently inefficient.65 Rather, a less 
burdensome approach-which would destroy a carrier's ability to leverage 
access against competitors-would simply require networks to obtain 
revenue from their subscribers and apportion the cost incremental to 
interconnection in proportion to its benefit.66 
A. Common Carriers and Interconnection 
The law has used the term "common carrier" since the Middle Ages.67 
Originally an outgrowth of the guild system, common carriage included all 
sorts of tradesmen.68 By the nineteenth century, at least in the United 
States, courts applied the category largely to those involved in 
infrastructure-type industries, such as dock owners, toll bridge and road 
operators, telegraph operators, and perhaps most important for the 
development of legal doctrine, railroads.69 
Common carriers are subject to special regulation. Traditionally, the 
most important of these regulations was the standard of care to which they 
were held.7o In addition, they cannot discriminate in service, but must 
charge, as a general rule, everyone the same rate and receive business from 
62. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
63. [d. 
64. See infra Section IILA. 
65. [d. 
66. While a carrier might still charge monopolist rates to end-users, in this blessed age, 
wireless, Internet, and IP telephony could discipline prices. 
67. Speta, supra note 45, at 255-56. 
68. 1 WYMAN, supra note 52, §§ 5-15, at 5-14. 
69. Speta, supra note 45, at 253-55. 
70. See id. at 253-54. 
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all.71 Finally, and most important, from a historical perspective, common 
carriers, as the Supreme Court recognized in the famous Munn v. Illinois 
case, were subject to rate regulation, ruling that the state could regulate the 
rates charged by certain grain elevators used in loading grain to railroads.72 
Given the constitutional barriers in regulating business before the 
Supreme Court changed its mind about such matters in the 1930s, the limits 
of common carriage were of vital importance for an obvious reason: a 
common carrier could be regulated in ways in which a non-common carrier 
could not.13 Most important, government bodies could set their rates. A 
tremendous amount of ink therefore was spilled in an attempt to demarcate 
the boundary between common carriers and non-common carriers during 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.74 
In Munn, the Court justified common carriage regulation in part 
because the loading facility had been "affected with a public interest," 
relying on a two hundred year old posthumous work by Lord Chief Justice 
Hale, De Portibus Maris.15 Hale identified certain businesses as "clothed 
with a public interest" and consequently subject to stringent government 
regulation.76 After Munn, the Court applied the "clothed in public interest" 
test to a variety of different scenarios, ruling that a grain elevator in North 
Dakota, fire insurance, housing, and ticket services were sufficiently 
affected with the public interest. 77 
The Supreme Court, however, never could settle what constituted a 
business affected in the public interest-and consequently could never set 
the precise boundaries of common carriage. 78 As the dissent in Munn 
derisively queried, why are grain warehouses so affected and consequently 
71. See id. at 253-55. 
72. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1876). 
73. See Barbara A. Cherry, Utilizing 'Essentiality of Access' Analyses to Migrate 
Risky, Costly and Untimely Government Interventions in Converging Telecommunications 
Technologies and Markets, 11 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 251, 255-69 (2003). 
74. See id. at 254-59. 
75. Munn, 94 U.S. at 125-26 (citing Hale, De Portibus Maris, 1 HARG. LAw TRACTS 78 
(1776». The tenn "common carrier" is somewhat narrower than "businesses affected with a 
public interest." See Cherry, supra note 73, at 255-69. 
76. Id. at 120 (citing Hale, supra note 75, at 78). 
77. Brass v. North Dakota ex rei. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391,405 (1894) (a North Dakota 
grain elevator); Gennan Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 418 (1914) (fire 
insurance); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (housing in New York State and the 
District of Columbia); Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (ticket re-sellers 
or "scalpers"), overruled in part by Olsen v. Neb. ex rei. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 
U.S. 236 (1941). For an extensive discussion of these lines of cases, see Breck P. 
McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759, 
767-87 (1930). 
78. Munn, 94 U.S. at 152 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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susceptible to regulation, but not providers of "calico gown[s]" or "city 
mansion[s].,,79 The Court toyed with numerous limiting principles. Some 
decisions state the term applies only to monopolies,80 but the Court later 
dismissed that rule.81 Similarly, the Court rejected the notion that the 
power rested solely upon of a public franchise of privilege. 82 Chief Justice 
Taft attempted to formulate the test as "[b ]usinesses which though not 
public at their inception [like those carried under by public grant or 
historically labeled as common carriage by the common law], may be fairly 
said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to 
some government regulation.,,83 Later, the Court stated that "the rule is 
confined to conveniences made public because the privilege of maintaining 
them has been granted by government or because there has arisen what 
may be termed a constructive grant of the use to the public. ,,84 
Also seeking a basis to the distinction, contemporary commentators 
argued for various positions on the limits of common carriage.85 Breck P. 
McAllister concludes the term is largely empty, but should yield to "[a] 
pragmatic approach ... [that] will bring the process of judicial review into 
step with new economic problems .... ,,86 Bruce Wyman stated in his 
definitive treatise on common carriage, "[i]n all of the business to be 
discussed in these chapters, competition, although from a legal point of 
view possible, is from the economic point of view improbable .... virtual 
monopoly will henceforth prevail.,,87 Charles K. Burdick criticized 
Wyman's view arguing that common carriage applies to those activities 
which historically had been provided by the king or under the king's writ, 
to activity which the public had assisted the enterprise in some manner; 
through public spending, a grant of eminent domain authority, the use of 
public property, or the establishment of a legal monopoly.88 
79. /d. (Field, J., dissenting). 
80. Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 747 (1878) (Bradley, 1., dissenting); Spring 
Valley Waterworks v. SchottIer, 110 U.S. 347, 354 (1884) (both stating that Munn applies 
only to monopolies). 
81. German Alliance Ins. Co., 233 U.S. at 4\0 (stating that Brass, 153 U.S. at 402, 
affirming Munn, "denuded ... the limiting element which was supposed to beset it-that to 
justify regulation of a business the business must have a monopolistic character. That 
distinction was pressed and answered."). 
82. Id.at411-12. 
83. Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). 
84. Tyson & Bros., 273 U.S. at 439. 
85. E.g., I WYMAN, supra note 52, § 36, at 30; McAllister, supra note 77, at 790; 
Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pts. 1-
3), II COLUM. L. REV. 514,616,743 (1911). 
86. MCAllister, supra note 77, at 790. 
87. I WYMAN, supra note 52, § 36, at 30. 
88. Burdick (pt. I), supra note 85, at 514-27. 
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After the New Deal, however, the importance of these debates 
lessened because the Supreme Court broadened the powers of 
governmental regulation.89 The judicial common law of common carriage, 
however, survived and continues to delineate common carriers' property 
rights. These rights are still basic to those industries, like the telephones, 
which are indisputably common carriers even though courts never clearly 
defined common carriage.9o 
Most important to this Article's purposes are the common law rights 
concerning interconnection which were primarily established in the railroad 
context. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Denver & New 
Orleans Railroad Co., the Court ruled that a railroad does not have the 
right to demand that another railroad stop at its junction and interchange 
business there, even if it has established joint junctions with other 
railroads.91 Thus, it is clear that a common carrier is under no obligation to 
establish connections with another carrier.92 However, the ruling did not 
upset the established right that if a railroad stops at a junction, it must still 
accept traffic from all customers, including competitors.93 Rather, it rested 
89. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding regulated 
prices in a non-common carriage industry); see also Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of 
Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 957 (1997) ("The original form of the 
economic critique treated regulation largely as a form of cartelizing, and this proved fruitful 
for many of the industry-specific regulatory programs, such as the control of price and entry 
by public utility and common carrier regulation, programs preceding or created by the New 
Deal."); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1442 (1987); see also Cherry, supra note 73, at 260 ("In Nebbia ... the Supreme 
Court effectively broadened the scope of permissible regulation ... so that the need to prove 
that a business did or did not fall into the historical classes of businesses affected with a 
public interest fell into disuse"). 
90. See, e.g., Hockett v. State, 5 N.E. 178, 183 (Ind. 1886). 
91. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Denver & New Orleans R.R. Co., 110 
U.S. 667, 682-83 (1884). The Court stated: 
!d. 
Under these circumstances, to hold that, if the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
continued to stop at its old station, after the Denver & New Orleans was built, a 
refusal to stop at the junction of the Denver & New Orleans was an unreasonable 
discrimination as to facilities in favor of the Denver & Rio Grande Company, and 
against the Denver & New Orleans, would be, in effect, to declare that every 
railroad company which forces a connection of its road with that of another 
company has a right, under the constitution or at the common law, to require the 
company with which it connects to do a connecting business at the junction, if it 
does a similar business with any other company under any other circumstances. 
Such, we think, is not the law. 
92. /d. 
93. See id. at 681-82 ("The only remaining questions are as to the obligation of the 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Company to carry for the Denver & New Orleans when 
passengers go to, or freight is delivered at, the regular stations, and the prices to be charged. 
As to the obligation to carry, there is no dispute, and we do not understand it to be claimed 
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its judgment on the notion that "[a]t common law, a carrier is not bound to 
carry except on his own line.,,94 
The Express Cases, which some commentators have called the most 
"salient" precedent for common carrier interconnection,95 are generally 
(and largely correctly) believed to stand for the proposition that common 
carriers are not "common carrier[s] of common carriers.,,96 In other words, 
common carriers need not carry their competitors' traffic.97 The Express 
Cases involved express services, which provided special shipping services 
using their own cars, over tracks owned by other railroad companies.98 
Generally, these service companies contracted with railroads to run on their 
tracks.99 Unhappy with the terms they were receiving, several of them 
sued to gain the same rights to run trains as the railroad's own trains. IOO 
The Supreme Court ruled that railroads could exclude the express trains, 
saying that 
While it has uniformly been the habit of railroad companies to 
arrange, at the earliest practicable moment, to take one express 
company on some or all their passenger trains, or to provide some 
other way of doing an express business on their lines, it has never 
been the practice to grant such a privilege to more than one 
company at the same time, unless a statute or some special 
circumstances made it necessary or desirable. 101 
It was generally concluded that these cases established the principle that 
common carriers could refuse interconnection. 
None of the cases, however, overturned the common law rule that 
railroads must accept traffic or freight at public junctions and depots from 
everyone, including competitors. In this way, despite the Supreme Court 
cases that limited common carriage law, railroads remained interconnecting 
networks-at least from the consumer perspective. Notice that in Atchison, 
the Court stated that the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad did not 
have to stop at the junction of Denver and New Orleans Railroad-but the 
that carriage has ever been refused when applied for at the proper place."). 
94. [d. at 680. 
95. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 47; see also MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.31, at 13 (1992) ("The problems first appeared in [the 
Express Cases]."); Bell, supra note 47, at 1759 n.65. 
96. The Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 21 (1886). 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 2-3. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 5-6. 
101. [d. at 27-28. 
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other railroad could stop at the Atchison depot and exchange traffic. 102 
Similarly, although the Express Cases ruled that railroads did not have to 
bear competitors' trains, they did not alter the rule that railroads had to bear 
freight presented by competitors. 103 
Contemporary commentators recognized neither the Express Cases 
nor Atchison altered the "hand-off' right of interconnection. Writing in 
1911, Harvard professor Bruce Wyman wrote that a common carrier "may 
not refuse altogether to have dealing with [competitors], to accept goods 
from them, for example. . . . it is the duty of the railroad as a common 
carrier to accept from any person tendering goods."I04 This means that a 
railroad must deliver "certain goods tendered at one point on its line to 
another point where that line connects with the second carrier."los Wyman 
notes that courts adopted this duty from bailers and stagecoaches and 
applied it to railroads and then later to telegraphs. 106 
Further, common carriers in the places at which they established 
interconnection, could never discriminate in the price or terms they charged 
for goods received from consumers or from competitors. 107 Wyman quotes 
an 1839 opinion by Chief Justice Parker of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, dealing with a stage line running from Nashua to Amherst that only 
took those passengers arriving to Nashua who used a particular firm: 
"The defendant might well have desired that passengers at Lowell 
should take French's line because it connected with his. But if he 
had himself been the proprietor of the stages from Lowell to 
Nashua, he could have had no right to refuse to take a passenger 
from Nashua, merely because he did not see fit to come to that 
place in his stage. It was not for him to inquire whether the 
plaintiff came to Nashua from one town or another, or by one 
conveyance or another. That the plaintiff proposed to travel 
onward from that place, could not injuriously affect the 
defendant's business; nor was the plaintiff to be punished, 
because he had come to Nashua in a particular manner." 108 
Indeed, federal courts have long recognized the common carrier duty 
102. Atchison, 110 U.S. at 682; see note 95. 
103. The Express Cases, 117 U.S. at 28. 
104. 1 WYMAN, supra note 52, § 510, at 432. 
105. 1 id. § 515, at 438. 
106. 1 id. § 510, at 432; 1 id. § 515, at 438. 
107. 1 id. § 524, at 447-48. 
108. 1 id. § 524, at 447 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N.H. 
481, at *5 (1839». 
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of telephone companies as common carriers to interconnect with all, 
including non-telephonic competitors, provided such competitors sought 
interconnection in the manner in which a member of the public did. 109 The 
issue emerged when telephone companies refused to permit telegraph 
companies to subscribe to telephone networks. The telephone companies 
refused because, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, they 
competed against telegraph in long-distance messaging; the prices of long-
distance calls were so high that telegraphy offered a competitive 
alternative. When consumers called their local telegraph office and recited 
their international telegraph message, the phone company would lose 
business. Federal courts ruled that as common carriers, phone companies 
could not refuse interconnection to these competitors. 110 
Applying this precedent to telephone interconnection is vexing. On 
one hand, a telephone company is a common carrier and should receive 
calls from all, including competitors, just as railroads receive freight from 
all. On the other hand, because telephone companies cannot receive traffic 
efficiently from competitors without special physical interconnection, 
telephone companies should not have to connect with competitors. 
B. Common Carriage and Telephone Interconnection 
1. History 
In 1894, when the Bell telephone patent lapsed, the first AT&T 
monopoly, based on its exclusive technology, ended. III After its expiration 
"[a]lmost immediately, an independent telephone movement with its own 
operating companies, equipment manufactures, publications, and trade 
associations took shape.,,112 These new telephone companies sought 
interconnection with AT&T for obvious reasons. AT&T was the only 
109. Delaware & A. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delaware, 50 F. 677, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1892); 
Postal Cable Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tele. Co. 177 F. 726, 727 (C.C. Tenn. 1910); 
Missouri ex rei. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. v. Bell Tel. Co., 23 F. 539, 540 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 
1885). This dispute has re-emerged 100 years later with IP telephony and long-distance. 
Cherie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators Poised to 
Address the Status of [P Telephony?, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 27-30 (2003). 
Consumers can call their Internet provider (using dial-up or DSL) and place a long-distance 
call over the Internet, avoiding long-distance charges-just as consumers called the 
telegraph company and avoided international calling charges. [d. at 20-21. As discussed 
infra Section lILA., IP telephony may induce a change in intercarrier compensation, as 
telephone companies could really stop it only by refusing interconnection with the internet, 
just as they tried to refuse interconnection with the telegraphs. 
110. [d. at 100. 
Ill. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 43. 
112. [d.; see also MACMEAL, supra note 5, at 24. 
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company with a national long-distance network, and therefore independents 
could not have offered long-distance service without interconnection and 
most likely could not have effectively competed, at least in the long run. I 13 
AT&T, at first, refused interconnection. I 14 Independents brought 
suits demanding interconnection and, despite the claims of Sidak, Spulber 
and others, the decisions were somewhat mixed, as discussed below, 
though on the whole, the courts found no right to physical 
interconnection. I IS Despite these rulings, as Milton Mueller has shown, 
AT&T's policy changed during the first years of the last century, and it did 
interconnect, at times, with the independents. I 16 
AT&T's general unwillingness to interconnect, as well as its growing 
domination of the telephone industry, did generate federal antitrust 
regulatory concern. I 17 As mentioned above, starting in 1907, numerous 
states passed interconnection laws, and in 1914, Department of Justice 
authorities negotiated with AT&T the Kingsbury Commitment. 118 This 
agreement, so named because its terms were set forth in a letter from 
AT&T Vice President Nathan C. Kingsbury to the Department of Justice, 
offered, among other things, to open up its long-distance exchanges under 
rather expensive toll charges. I 19 
Thus, the state interconnection laws and the Kingsbury Commitment 
essentially ended the common law development of interconnection law, 
moving it out of judicial control and into the regulatory sphere. With the 
possible exception of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,120 federal courts 
had very little to say on interconnection until 1978 and MCl 
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, which opened the door for MCl's 
entrance into competitive long-distance. 121 Nonetheless, the early judicial 
opinions of the first part of the twentieth century provide the legal 
113. Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-
1920,34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 343 (1969). "Refusal to connect with independent 
telephone systems for long-distance telephone service afforded Bell a stronger means of 
curbing the independent movement. Since Bell was the pioneer in this field, its refusal to 
connect confined independent companies within the limits of the particular territories they 
served." [d. at 350. 
114. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 44. 
115. [d. at 44-45; see SlDAK & SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
REGULATORY CONTRACT, supra note 13, at 13; Sidak & Spulber, Givings. Takings, supra 
note 13, at 1085. 
116. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 107-11. 
117. [d. at 129. 
118. [d. at 129-30. 
119. [d. 
120. 282 U.S. 133 (1930). 
121. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365,380 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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assumptions that have motivated a hundred years of regulation. 
2. The Common Law of Interconnection 
In general, cases have taken three approaches to the problem of 
telephone interconnection. First and most commonly, they simply stated 
there was no right to interconnection. 122 Interconnection, if mandated, 
therefore, required intercarrier payments-this is the assumption that 
motivates most regulatory mandatory interconnection today. Second, there 
is a small line of cases dealing with exclusive contracts between long-
distance companies and local exchanges and ruling that such contracts are 
illegal-all long-distance companies must be able to interconnect with 
local exchanges. 123 These cases establish a right to physical 
interconnection, at least with regard to long-distance companies. 124 
Finally-and most foreign to modern expectations-some courts state 
(what was apparently a common rule of the time) that although there was 
no right to physical interconnection, telephones qua common carriers had 
to transmit messages. 125 Thus, if a Bell customer called an independent, 
the Bell central office would call, on a separate line, the independent office, 
which would then ring its customer and tell him or her to go to a public 
Bell telephone and call the Bell central office. 
a. No Physical Interconnection Right 
The majority of cases simply state interconnection is not a right. 
Regulators may mandate it, however, as a legitimate exercise of their 
powers. 126 The analysis is largely formalistic, looking to common carrier 
122. See infra notes 126-138 and accompanying text. 
123. See infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text. 
124. Id. 
125. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
126. Okla.-Ark. Tel. Co. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 45 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1930) ("[A]t 
common law, a telephone company owes no duty to make physical connections with other 
telephone companies."); Memphis Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 F. 835, 840-
42 (6th Cir. 1916); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wright-Dickinson Hotel Co., 214 F. 666, 669-70 
(D.C. Or. 1914) (stating that interconnection is not a taking but a reasonable exercise of 
police powers, like physical connection required between railroads, a charge is reasonable 
compensation); N.W. Bell Tel. v. Cascade Tel. Co., 234 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 1975) 
(rejecting taking claim on the ground that '''the state [has] the power to compel telephone 
companies physically to connect their lines... provision however, being made for 
compensation by the use by the patrons of one company of the line of the other 
company .... '" (quoting Annotation, Right and Duty of Telephone Companies to Make 
Physical Connections of Exchanges or Lines, 11 A.L.R. 1204, 1212 (1921»; Clay County 
Coop. Tel. Ass'n v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 190 P. 747, 749-52, 754 (Kan. 1920) (surveying 
Home Telephone Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Telephone Co., 139 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1911), State ex 
rei. Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 87 N.E. 644 (Ind. 1909), Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 
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law and ruling that because mandatory interconnection is not required for 
railroads, absent a regulatory mandate, the same rule should be applied to 
telephones. 127 As a result, if interconnection is mandated, there must be 
196 F. 699, 705 (E.D. Wash. 1912), and United States Tel. Co. v. Cent. Union Tel. Co., 171 
F. 130 (N.D. Ohio 1909) and concluding no right of interconnection); Rural Home Tel. Co. 
v. Ky. & Ind. Tel. Co., 107 S.W. 787, 793 (Ky. 1908) (finding no contract and no right to 
interconnection); Gilman v. Somerset Farmers' Coop. Tel. Co., 151 A. 440, 443 (Me. 1930) 
("Requirement, fair and reasonable, that one public telephone utility connect its lines with 
those of another, would not amount, in a constitutional sense, to a taking of property."); 
State ex rei. Buffum Tel. Co. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 199 S.W. 962, 965 (Mo. 1917); 
Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. at 113 ("In other words, one telephone company, 
without the consent of the other, cannot take charge of and use the instrumentalities of such 
other company by compelling physical connection therewith."); Blackledge V. Farmers' 
Indep. Tel. Co. of Red Cloud, 181 N.W. 709,711 (Neb. 1921) ("[I]t is now quite universally 
recognized that the state ... may, in the exercise of its police power ... compel such 
physical connections ... provided that an arrangement is made so that the company required 
to render the service will receive proper compensation .... "); State ex rei. Utilities Comm'n 
V. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 148 S.E.2d 100, 113 (N.C. 1966) (A public utility cannot "'be 
compelled to give its property to the uses and benefits of a rival, except by some form of 
condemnation.'" (quoting Evansville & H. Traction CO. V. Henderson Bridge Co., 134 F. 
973, 978 (W.O. Ky. 1904))); Pioneer Tel. & Tel. CO. V. State, 134 P. 398, 399-400 (Okla. 
1913); City of Milbank V. Dakota Central Tel. Co., 159 N.W. 99, 100 (S.D. 1916) ("[T]he 
connecting of telephone exchanges ... is not an exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
but ... is a mere regulation of a public service corporation, if not under an implied power 
resulting from the nature of the franchise enjoyed by the corporation, then under the police 
powers of the state."); Home Tel. CO. V. People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 141 S.W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 
1911) ("[E]ach telephone company under the common law is independent of all other 
telephone companies, save for the duty to receive and forward to any point on its line 
messages received from such other company or companies, and ... is not bound to accord 
to any ... outside organization or its patrons connection with its switchboard on an equality 
with its own patrons .... "); State V. Skagit River Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 P. 885, 892 (Wash. 
1915) (Interconnection only "can be required as a state regulation within the police power to 
accord the same facilities, conveniences, and uses to another or other telephone companies 
upon equal terms."). 
127. Memphis Tel. Co., 231 F. at 840 ("[T]he making and maintenance of a connection 
between two telephone companies in the absence of a contract between them depends on 
statute." (citing Home Tel. Co., 141 S.W. at 845)); Woodlands Telecomms. Corp. V. AT&T, 
447 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("At common law, there was no duty to 
interconnect facilities between carriers."); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 196 F. at 705 ("[I]t has 
never been held or intimated that. . . a company loses all control over its property or 
obligates itself to grant similar privileges to every other company that may apply 
therefore."); Cadwallader, 87 N.E. at 650 ("[I]n the absence of statutory regulation of the 
subject, the analogies furnished by the railroad cases,and their reasoning with respect to 
connecting carriers, fix the true legal relations ... [which do not require] in the absence of 
statute or contract, to furnish the patrons of each with unrestricted service by each 
submitting its or his exchange to the other."); Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. at 113 
("[O]ne telephone company, without the consent of the other, cannot take charge of and use 
the instrumentalities of such other company by compelling physical connection 
therewith .... [T]his question has been settled by this court in the railroad cases."); United 
States Tel. CO. V. Middlepoint Home Tel. Co., 13 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 337, 347 (Cir. Ct. 1910) 
("[T]his rule of indiscriminate service applies only to the public. It does not apply as 
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some sort of compensation, or there is a taking. 128 
The question is which costs should be compensated. On this point, 
cases' analyses are undeveloped. Many explicitly state that there is no 
right to interconnection because there is no right to physical 
interconnection under common carriage law and leave it at that. 129 They 
then require the regulatory commissions to determine the cost this physical 
invasion imposes.1 3o Billings Mutual Telephone Co. v. Rocky Mountain 
Bell Telephone Co., an early case, is typical: 
The right to use is the thing the law has said may be 
acquired. Therefore, where appropriate proceedings are instituted, 
as in this case, it is this right of use that is to be acquired; and the 
reasonable, practical method by which the right may be enjoyed is 
use by a connection made so that the one company, by its 
operators, may can the operators of the other company, which 
must receive the long-distance business of the subscribers of the 
plaintiff company and care for the same very much as it would 
like business of its own patrons. In other words, where two 
companies owning different lines of telephones in Montana 
cannot agree upon the compensation for the privilege of 
between public service companies desiring physical connection of plants or joint use of 
facilities. "); Home Tel. Co., 141 S. W. at 849 ("We are of the opinion on the grounds above 
stated that the defendant companies acted within their rights when they refused to yield to 
the complainant company the intimate connection it demanded."). 
128. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 196 F. at 703 ("All the authorities agree that at common 
law each telephone company is independent of all other telephone companies, save for the 
duty to receive and forward to any point on its line messages received from such other 
company or companies .... "); Mich. State Tel. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n, 161 N.W. 240, 
245 (Mich. 1916) ("It is for complainant to show affirmatively that the physical connection 
ordered by the commission will inflict upon it an undue loss and one that cannot be 
prevented by the contemplated adjustment of rates, tolls, and charges."); Home Tel. Co., 141 
S.W. at 848 (Mandatory interconnection "enables one company to take the property of 
another for public use without compensation, and deprives the latter company of its property 
without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of this state and of the United 
States."); S.W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 207 S.W. 308, 309 (Tex. 1918) ("The company is 
merely made to provide a facility whereby patrons of another line may, by means of that 
line and for a charge paid the company for the service, have access to its toll lines. It this be 
a 'taking' of the company's property, the property of such a company is likewise taken 
every time the company is made to connect its line with the store-house or residence of a 
local subscriber."); State v. Skagit River Tel. & Tel., 147 P. 885, 893 (Wash. 1915) 
("[B]efore [the state commission's] order [for interconnection] will be valid it must provide 
for the payment to the Skagit Company of the cost of making the connection .... It must 
further provide for such reasonable joint rates or tolls. .. for the use of the Skagit 
Company's lines."). 
129. E.g., Billings Mut. Tel. Co. v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 155 F. 207,211 
(C.C.D. Mont. 1907). 
130. Id. 
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connection and use, the law of Montana obliges the one to submit 
to connection with the other and (upon payment of damages to be 
assessed), to accept a patronage [though it] ... could not be 
compelled ... were it not for the provisions of the Constitution 
and laws of the state. 131 
Courts envisioned these payments as toll charges paid by the 
interconnecting carrier. 132 Thus, the intercarrier payment was born. It 
typically required the payment of the "regular" toll charge (long-distance) 
and an extra charge. 133 
Notice, however, the nature of these payments is different than those 
of common carriers. Railroads, for example, cannot discriminate between 
competitors and members of the public in receiving and transporting 
goods. 134 Billings Mutual mandates, on the other hand, a special rate to be 
paid when one telephone company uses another's line. 135 This rate was not 
necessarily related to any general rate it charged the pUblic. 136 The 
common law courts, when considering the matter, are generally unanimous 
in this special tariff requirement. 
The competitive significance of these rates became immediately 
apparent. The Kingsbury Commitment's access charge regime required that 
AT&T lines terminated all long-distance traffic, thereby creating for AT&T 
131. /d.at212. 
132. E.g., id. 
133. E.g., Wis. Tel. Co. v. RR. Comm'n of Wis., 156 N.W. 614, 618 (Wis. 1916). In a 
rare verbatim quotation of an interconnection regime between a Bell and an independent, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin quotes the interconnection order: 
"It is further ordered, that each subscriber of the Wisconsin Telephone 
Company desiring service over the toll lines of the La Crosse Telephone 
Company shall be charged for each message, in addition to the regular charge of 
the La Crosse Telephone Company ... [f]or all distances of not over 50 miles 
from the office of the La Crosse Telephone Company, 5 cents; for all distances 
over 50 miles and not over 100 miles from such office, 10 cents; and for all 
distances over 100 miles from such office, 15 cents." 
[d. (quoting Winter v. Tel. Cos., 15 WIS. RR. COMM'N REP. 36,42). A similar approach was 
used in the Kingsbury Commitment: "[t]he subscribers of the Independent company having 
toll connections [with AT&T] ... shall pay for such connections the regular toll charge of 
the Bell company and in addition thereto ... a connection charge of ten cents .... " Letter 
from N.C. Kingsbury, Vice President, AT&T, to the United States Attorney General (Dec. 
19, 1913), reprinted in MACMEAL, supra note 5, at 206. 
134. E.g., McCoy v. Cincinnati, I., St. L., & C.RR. Co., 13 F. 3, 7, 9-10 (C.C.S.D. 
Ohio 1882) (holding that a railroad could not form exclusive delivery relationship with one 
stock-yard at the expense of others). 
135. Billings Mut. Tel. Co., 155 F. at 212; Wis. Tel. Co., 156 N.W. at 621 ("Whatever 
appropriation there is, is by the person who is using the wire, and for this he pays the regular 
toll charge, and something additional besides."). 
136. /d. 
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a termination monopoly over all long-distance and placing the 
independents at a clear competitive disadvantage. 137 As Mueller 
concludes, the non-reciprocal tariffs and interconnection requirements (that 
all toll traffic be carried by AT&T at rates much higher than previously 
charged) doomed the independents. 138 
b. Long Distance Interconnection 
Three cases-one federal, two from state supreme courts-ruled that 
local telephone companies must connect to all long-distance companies that 
wish to interconnect. 139 In other words, these cases create a right for long-
distance companies to interconnect with local exchanges. 140 
The reasoning behind these opinions proceeds from common carriage 
law's anti-discrimination requirement. Just as a common carrier cannot 
discriminate among end-users, so it cannot discriminate among long-
distance companies. 141 If a local company connects with one, it must 
connect with all. 142 Some have criticized the opinion as "airy" and, indeed, 
these cases cannot truly reconcile their holdings with the railroad 
interconnection cases. 143 It is also claimed that the independents' efforts to 
build their own long-distance network were doomed because, without 
exclusive contracts with local phone companies, they could not compete 
against AT&T's established long-line network. 144 
While recognizing the conflict with the railroad cases, United States 
Telephone is probably the only case that recognizes the conflict between 
the common carrier right of hand-off and the technology of telephony in 
which physical interconnection, not merely hand-off, is required. 145 United 
137. [d. at 131-35. 
138. [d. 
139. United States Tel. Co. v. Cent. Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 130, 147 (N.D. Ohio 1909), 
ajJ'd 202 F. 66 (6th Cir. 1913); Union Trust & Say. Bank v. Kinloch Long-Distance Tel. 
Co., 101 N.E. 535, 538-39 (Ill. 1913); Home Tel. Co. v. Granby & Neosho Tel. Co., 126 
S. W. 773, 781 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) ("We therefore conclude that, as by the contract 
involved here the defendant granted the right of a physical connection with its exchange to 
the plaintiff, this raised an obligation on the part of defendant to grant the same right to 
other telephone companies as well .... ") (citing State ex rei. Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 87 
N.E. 644, 652 (Ind. 1909». 
140. United States Tel. Co., 171 F. at 147; Union Trust & Sav. Bank, 101 N.E. at 537-
38; Cadwallader, 87 N.E. at 652; Granby & Neosho Tel. Co., 126 S.W. at 781. 
141. United States Tel. Co., 171 F. at 147. 
142. [d. at 144 ("If the local company extends the use of its lines to long-distance 
service, does it make the long-distance business any the less of a public character than its 
local service?"). 
143. Bell, supra note 47, at 1770. 
144. [d. 
145. United States Tel. Co., 171 F. at 141-43. 
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States Telephone states that 
[T]he telephone subscriber must, in order to have efficient and 
satisfactory long-distance service, be able to talk to the individual 
with whom he desires to have conversation. He cannot relay his 
conversation as passengers can change cars, or freight can be 
transferred from one station or road to another. The act of 
speaking over a telephone is single and instantaneous, and is to be 
radically distinguished in its character from an act of 
transportation .... 
All of these observations are intended to illustrate the truth 
that the telephone business, in its practical operations, is to be 
distinguished from railroads, and even from telegraph companies, 
because the telegraphic message may be relayed and repeated 
before reaching its destination; while a conversation may be 
repeated, yet everybody knows that in common practice that is not 
telephoning at all, and such a method of communication between 
persons far distant from each other is practically unknown. One 
may, it is true, send a message to another to be repeated, but that 
is like a conversation that one tells another to repeat to a third 
person. That is rather telegraphing than telephoning. 146 
These cases, however, are vague as to who should bear 
interconnection's cost. In that regard, they say little to the dominant cases' 
argument that there must be compensation for the use of other carriers' 
networks. Their indifference to these basic questions perhaps explains their 
limited influence. 
c. Simple Common Carrier Conveyance 
Where there was no interconnection between two telephone 
companies, it was often the practice-indeed a legal duty given telephone 
companies' status as common carriers-for one telephone company to call 
the central office of the other telephone company that would then call its 
subscriber and tell her to go to a public phone belonging to the first 
telephone company. 147 A court described the process: 
146. [d. 
147. Mich. State Tel. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n., 161 N.W. 240, 243 (Mich. 1916) 
("Without the physical connection each subscriber to a Citizens' telephone is entitled to the 
same use of complainant's lines that he would have with the physical connection; the 
difference being that with the lines connected he can talk from his own telephone, while 
without the connection he would be obliged to go to a public station of complainant 
company."); Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. 108, 112 (Mo. 1911) 
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[W]here there was a call over the Bell toll line for a resident of La 
Crosse who was a subscriber to the exchange of the local 
company, but not to that of the plaintiff, an operator in the local 
company's office was notified of such call by telephone. The 
operator then notified its subscriber of the call, and such 
subscriber could respond only by going to a Bell station or to a 
place where a Bell phone was in use .... the average waiting time 
was half an hour. 148 
395 
These cases clearly recognized the right to hand-off; however, the 
mere transmission of messages was hardly feasible compared to the 
efficiency and convenience of physically connected switchboard. These 
cases illuminate the questions of allocation of cost and of takings. The 
calling party "paid" through her general subscription to get the message 
forwarded from her carrier's office to that of the recipient. Once the 
network received the call, the second carrier then absorbed the cost of 
contacting its subscriber. There was no taking because sender and receiver 
split the cost of interconnection. This approach perfectly mirrored 
traditional common carriage law. 
3. Conclusion 
The basic premise underlying huge portions of telecommunications 
law-that the common law gives carriers the right to be free from 
interconnection and that intercarrier payments must compensate for this 
right's infringement-is incorrect. The dominant strain is against 
interconnection, but there are distinct countercurrents. Considering the 
short time span over which they were written, it is perhaps not surprising 
that these cases failed to reconcile the common carriage right of hand-off 
with the common carrier's right not to physically interconnect with other 
carriers. As the following Section argues, this was because they failed to 
(interpreting statute); Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 141 S.W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 
1911) ("[U]nder the common law [each telephone company] is independent of all other 
telephone companies, save for the duty to receive and forward to any point on its line 
messages received from such other company or companies .... "). 
148. Wis. Tel. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 156 N.W. 614, 616 (Wis. 1916); see also 
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (D.C. Wash. 1912) ("[A]t common law 
each telephone company is independent of all other telephone companies, save for the duty 
to receive and forward to any point on its lines message received from such other company 
or companies .... "); Mich. State Tel. Co., 161 N.W. at 243 ("The business of a telephone 
company is to transmit oral messages from one point to another, and for that purpose every 
patron, whether he is a subscriber or not, has the use of its lines for the time being. That is 
the public use to which they are dedicated. Without the physical connection each subscriber 
to a Citizens' telephone is entitled to the same use of the complainant's lines that he would 
have with the physical connection .... "). 
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understand the economics of interconnection, properly define the property 
rights of common carriers, and carefully identify the costs incremental to 
interconnection. 149 
II. TAKINGS, HAND-OFF INTERCONNECTION, AND PHYSICAL 
INTERCONNECTION 
Modem takings law, on which the early common law cases did not 
rely, has created two possible types of takings potentially applicable to 
mandatory interconnection. 150 First, government regulation is a taking ( a 
regulatory taking) if it (i) imposes economic damage and (ii) this damage 
rises above some standard. 15I For decades, as law students in property 
class know all too well, the Supreme Court has struggled over what this 
standard might be and has produced numerous tests for different types of 
economic regulation, including whether or not such damage interferes with 
any economically viable use of the property,152 interferes with a reasonable 
return on its investment,153 or eliminates the entire value of the land. 154 
Most commentators agree that the Court has failed to produce a coherent 
doctrine of regulatory takings. 155 Second, a physical occupation is a per se 
taking. 156 If the government physically invades property, it must offer 
compensation (a per se taking) regardless of the quantum of economic 
damage. 157 
Interestingly, under modem takings law, both physical connection and 
hand-off interconnection are arguably takings. 158 Both require carriers to 
receive traffic onto their property whether or not they wish to. 159 For 
149. See infra Section II. 
150. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 303 (2002) ("[T]he test of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a 
distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings."). 
151. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 38, § 11.13 (a "property use regulation will 
constitute a taking of property for which compensation is due if the regulation unjustifiably 
shifts social costs to an individual property owner or a group of property owners"); see also 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
152. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,496 (1987). 
153. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
154. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 1019 (1992). 
155. E.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1450 (2000) (calling the regulatory taking decisions "ad hoc" and 
"incoheren[ t n. 
156. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 303. 
157. !d. at 322; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 451 
(1982). 
158. See infra Section IV.B. 
159. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 397 2004
2004] Network Interconnection and Takings 397 
instance, the stagecoach must accept passengers from a competing 
stagecoach; 160 the telephone company must receive a call on its property 
from a non-connected network. 161 In addition, mandatory interconnection 
may be a regulatory taking because it imposes costs. Whether these costs 
reach the level necessary for a regulatory taking is, of course, not clear 
because regulatory takings law, in all its celebrated vagueness and 
imprecision, hardly identifies a point at which a taking occurs. 
This Section argues that the distinction between hand-off and physical 
interconnection makes sense only if examined through basic 
microeconomic pricing theory, not the formalistic categories of modem 
takings law. Hand-off interconnection is not a taking because a court can 
presume that charging a carrier's general price will recover its costs. 162 On 
the other hand, physical interconnection, which requires increased capital 
investment, does change the rate structure, and a general rate may not 
recover those additional costs. 163 
The common law courts presaged the general takings test for rates set 
by regulated utilities. l64 This test, first set forth in Federal Power 
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., states "if the total effect of the rate 
order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at 
an end." 165 There is an "unconstitutional taking of property when a utility 
that has made a substantial investment in serving the public interest is 
denied recovery of its investment from ratepayers.,,166 However, the test 
does not require that a utility recover all or any of its particular, specific 
costs. 167 The test merely states that as long as the rate, in the aggregate, 
allows for a just and reasonable return on its capital, the rate is 
constitutional. 168 
The common law courts arguably looked at the rate charged, the 
utility capital investment, and examined the effect of interconnection on 
both. If it could be reasonably presumed that interconnection's cost could 
160. E.g., Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N.H. 481, at *5 (1839). 
161. E.g., United States Tel. Co. v. Cent. Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 130, 147 (N.D. Ohio 
1909). 
162. Id. 
163. !d. 
164. E.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,602 (1944). 
165. !d.; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,310 (1989); In re 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1968); Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. 
Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 566 (1945). 
166. David P. Barker, Who Pays? An Analysis of the Allocation of the Costs of 
Canceled Nuclear Power Plants After Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 999, 
1006 (1989). 
167. Id. at 1007. 
168. Id. 
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be recovered through end-user charges, because interconnection did not 
result in a change in capital investment under a given capacity and 
demand, then interconnection was not a taking. If it did change capital 
investment (which physical connection does), then there would be no 
assurance that a general rate charged to end-users would adequately 
recover costs and there would be a taking. 
The following Section first analyzes the need for mandatory 
interconnection; why it is necessary at all. 169 The Article concludes that 
given network effects, the possibility of vertical foreclosure, and the market 
power of incumbent monopolists, mandatory interconnection is necessary 
in order to introduce competition into a previously monopolized network 
industry.170 The Section then examines mandatory interconnection under 
modem takings doctrine, concluding that both hand-off and physical 
interconnection are arguably takings. l7l The Section contends, however, 
that the common law courts were correct in not finding a taking for hand-
off interconnection because it simply imposes costs that a standard rate 
would recover under a given capital investment. 172 On the other hand, 
mandatory physical interconnection does impose costs that the carrier's 
established rate may not recover, and, therefore, is a possible taking. 173 
A. Why the Need to Mandate Physical Interconnection? 
To economists, this concern about government-mandated 
interconnection must seem misplaced. If it is beneficial for networks to 
interconnect, they should negotiate the terms and do so without any 
governmental intervention. 174 And, indeed, interconnection is mutually 
beneficial. In fact, one of the earliest cases recognized in 1911 what 
economists now term "network effects": 175 
Neither would the fact that there was some expense incurred alter 
the situation [of mandatory interconnection], because it is the 
right of the state within reasonable limitations to require public 
service corporations to increase their facilities where the public 
169. See infra Section II.A. 
170. See infra Section II.B. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Jay Atkinson & Christopher Barnekov, A Coasian Alternative to Pigovian 
Regulation of Network Interconnection, at 1 n.3, Presentation at Competition in Networking: 
Wireless and Wireline Conference in London, UK (May 14, 2004) (draft on file with 
author); see generally, SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be 
a Concern Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 287, 301, 317-18 (1996). 
175. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 174, at 286-87. 
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interest requires the increase. Instead of damage resulting from 
the connection ordered, it would be more reasonable to suppose 
that both profit and convenience would result therefrom. 176 
399 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin correctly recognized that interconnection 
benefits both phone companies because both companies' customers can call 
more people and receive more calls. 177 Interconnection, therefore, makes 
each network more valuable. Why, therefore, should government need to 
compel mandatory interconnection? 
Despite this mutual benefit, there are less benign effects with 
networks: vertical foreclosure and the tipping phenomenon. If there are 
two networks, one large, the other small, a consumer would choose the 
larger one ceteris paribus simply because he or she would be able to call 
more people and receive more calls. Thus, a small network cannot 
compete with a large network unless there is interconnection so that both 
networks have the same sized calling universe. Without a similarly sized 
calling universe, the larger network will likely overpower the smaller. 178 
Mandatory interconnection, therefore, is necessary to allow smaller 
networks to survive, and probably essential when attempting to introduce 
competition into a formerly monopolized industry, like telephony. It is not 
surprising that many competitive local telephone companies (CLECs) 
claim that the incumbents have done everything in their power to stymie 
interconnection. The Supreme Court recently decided whether such 
allegations constituted an antitrust violation. 179 
In addition, it is reasonable to expect under certain circumstances that 
the larger network would refuse interconnection, or, at the very least, 
interconnect only selectively in those instances when it had to choose 
between not serving an area or interconnecting with an independent that 
was dominant in that area. 180 The history of telephony suggests this is the 
176. Wis. Tel. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 156 N.W. 614, 621 (Wis. 1916). 
177. /d. 
178. Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC 
UTILITY REGULATION 109, 146 (H. Trebing ed., 1979); Mark Annstrong et aI., The Access 
Pricing Problem: A Synthesis, 44 J.IND. ECON. 131 (1996); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 8. 
179. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct 872, 
880 (2004). In this case, the Court ruled that a refusal to interconnect does not constitute an 
antitrust violation under the refusal to deal or essential facilities doctrines. It is not clear 
how broadly this precedent will be interpreted. 
180. One economic description of this strategy is vertical foreclosure, which is a fonn 
of "raising rivals' costs." See Steven Salop, Practices that Credibly Facilitate Oligopoly 
Coordination, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (1986); 
Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION III (Mark Annstrong & Rob Porter eds.) (forthcoming). 
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case. 181 According to Mueller, competitive telephony, for the brief period 
it existed, was marked by "access competition" in which carriers competed 
for the greatest number of subscribers. 182 The Bell affiliated companies 
were generally disinclined to interconnect, but apparently did so under 
certain circumstances. 183 The independent companies, however, never 
gained the critical mass to compete effectively. 184 
B. Modern Takings Doctrine and Mandatory Interconnection 
Under modern standards mandatory interconnection constitutes a 
taking,185 but what flavor of taking, and what is the precise nature of the 
property taken? First, it likely is a physical, per se taking. I 86 
Interconnection generally requires a competitor to locate facilities in the 
incumbent's central offices or switching facilities. The FCC regulations 
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provide compensation for 
physical collocation of competitor facilities on incumbent's property using 
its TELRIC methodology.187 Commentators have claimed that "[i]f a 
regulation authorizes a third party to establish a permanent physical 
invasion, Loretto and Florida Power [together make clear] ... that it 
constitutes a per se taking [without resort to any of the considerations 
typically involved under both the Court's] ... regulatory takings and 
confiscatory rate-making [jurisprudence]." 188 
Contrary to such commentators,189 mandatory interconnection, 
because it imposes costs that are distinct from and in addition to the cost of 
181. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 44-46,55-60. 
182. See id. 
183. Id. at 44-46. 
184. Id. 
185. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 999. 
186. Id. at 947. 
187. See, e.g., In re Deployment of Wi reline Services Offering Advanced Telecomms. 
Capability & Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 
1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 17,806, 17,838 (Aug. 10, 2000); In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. 
Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761,4778 (Mar. 31, 1999); In re 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 11 
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,869-70 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]. 
188. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 946. 
189. Id. (citing Vee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529 (1992); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001». Spulber and Yoo correctly point out that the 
Supreme Court has stated that physical and regulatory takings "occupy separate spheres." 
Id. They also correctly point out that mandatory physical interconnection is probably a per 
se, physical taking. !d. However, it does not seem correct, as they appear to assume, that 
because mandatory interconnection constitutes a physical taking, it cannot also constitute a 
regulatory taking. The taking doctrines may be separate but one governmental action can 
implicate both. 
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physical occupation, at least implicates regulatory takings as well. 190 
Interconnection imposes the cost of handing off calls; a cost that was 
significant in the days of operators with switchboards but has diminished 
enormously with computer driven technology, and is rapidly approaching 
zero. 191 More significant, interconnection requires carriers to fortify their 
networks for additional traffic, if they wish to maintain their existing 
quality of service. 192 Thus, under modem takings law, mandatory 
interconnection is a physical taking and is possibly a regulatory taking. 193 
Further, if one follows modem doctrine and certain commentators' 
interpretations of it, then there is, at least, an argument that the common 
law courts were incorrect to claim that hand-off interconnection was not a 
taking; indeed, all of common carriage constitutes a taking under modem 
doctrine. Hand-off interconnection imposes the same types of costs as 
physical interconnection, and it would seem that the early courts were 
wrong in distinguishing between the two. A carrier that must unwillingly 
accept traffic from another carrier has its physical premises invaded by 
such traffic-just as the homeowner in Loretto had its property invaded by 
a cable connection. In like manner, hand-off imposes the incremental cost 
of each phone call, i.e., the cost that each call creates on the network. 
Further, hand-off interconnection would require additional fortification of 
networks. 
The distinction between hand-off and physical interconnection (and 
arguably common carriage itself) can be saved from constitutional takings 
objections if one examines how common carriers--or more broadly all 
networks, from the Internet and cable systems to the postal service or even 
toll roads-recover their costs. Drawing at least implicitly on the most 
basic microeconomics, courts were indeed correct in assuming that 
although hand-off would not impose unrecoverable costs, physical 
interconnection might do so. On the other hand, physical interconnection 
involved new common and fixed costs, which might not be recovered 
through the general rate. 
190. See id. at 947-48. 
191. See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 
F.C.C.R. 9151, 9191 & 9191 n. 158 (Apr. 27, 2001) (noting "the downward trend in 
intercarrier compensation rates"). 
192. See infra Section IlLB for a more technical discussion of this issue. 
193. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 966. 
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1. Right of Hand-off 
Basic microeconomic theory shows that mandating the right of hand-
off would not inflict economic damage or, more precisely, impose costs 
that a carrier could be presumed to recover. Assuming that a common 
carrier offers a price that provides it with a profit (a price that for each unit 
sold recovers its incremental cost and makes a contribution to fixed and 
common costs given a particular expected demand (number of units sold», 
mandating hand-off interconnection would not cause unrecoverable costs. 
Indeed, seen in this light, the only purpose of refusing interconnection 
arguably would be to inflict economic harm on competitors. 
Expanding on this standard model, consider the proverbial widget 
factory. Assume the factory has a fixed cost of $1000 for its equipment 
costs, real estate mortgage, etc., i.e., $1000 in fixed cost. 194 Each widget 
costs an extra $1 to produce in labor, electricity, etc., i.e., $1 in incremental 
costs. 195 Because the widget company will not choose to produce an 
additional widget if it cannot recover its marginal costs, the widget 
company must sell widgets at a price greater than $1. 196 
In addition to recovering its incremental cost, the widget price must 
also make some contribution to fixed costs. 197 This contribution depends 
on how many widgets the company expects to sell. 198 If it expects to sell 
only a couple of widgets, say two, their price must be high enough to 
recover fixed and incremental costs, i.e., $501; if it expects to sell many 
widgets, say 2000, then their price can be lower, i.e., $2 ($2000 total 
revenue recovers $1000 in fixed costs and $1000 in marginal costs). 199 Of 
course, a businessperson often does not know how much he will sell and no 
doubt prices represent best guesses of likely demand. 
Apply this basic pricing scheme to common carriers and to the 
distinction between hand-off and facilities-required interconnection. A 
common carrier provides a service-any unit of output from a telephone 
call to a ferry ride-for a price, which can be presumed to recover both her 
incremental and some portion of the fixed cost. If this price did not recover 
such costs, then the carrier would be soon out of business. At her 
established price and given fixed investment, there can be no way she can 
lose money with increased traffic. 200 
194. Luis M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 18-29 (2000). 
195. [d. 
196. /d. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. See id. at 20-21. This, of course, assumes a flat or decreasing marginal cost-an 
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A court can rightly mandate hand-off interconnection without concern 
that such a requirement would inflict any economic damage.201 Such 
mandatory interconnection simply provides more business at a price at 
which loss can be presumed to be impossible.202 The court does not have 
to inquire about the adequacy of the price because that is already set and 
presumably allows for the profitable running of the business.203 
2. Special Facilities Physical Interconnection 
Special facilities-based interconnection, however, changes these 
assumptions.204 Special facilities-based interconnection requires an 
additional plant facility, i.e., expending capital, and increasing fixed cost 
for new facilities. 205 Simply charging the established price may not 
recover costs.206 Courts quite naturally have been unwilling to make 
special facilities-rate interconnection a common carrier right.207 If a carrier 
on which interconnection were forced did not raise its rate, it would lose 
money, or at least, recover a below-market profit.208 Thus, mandatory 
physical interconnection might render a firm's going rate confiscatory even 
if the rate were perfectly remunerative prior to the imposed interconnection 
cost. 209 
assumption that violates a basic premise of microeconomics; eventually, marginal costs do 
increase. Nonetheless, given the enormous, almost infinite capacity of modem switching 
equipment, the assumption is reasonable at least for moderate increases in traffic: price is 
higher than marginal costs, i.e., telephone companies don't really sell individual calls. [d. 
Further, as argued below, any increase in marginal cost should be recovered from end-users. 
[d. 
201. [d. at 19-21. 
202. [d. 
203. [d. 
204. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. 
207. Of course, if there is a preexisting connection between carriers, numerous courts 
have ruled that carriers are not free to discontinue interconnection---or, at the very least, 
contracts for interconnection are read very broadly. McCardle v. Akron Tel. Co., 160 N.E. 
48, 49-50 (Ind. App. 1928) ("The plants of the two companies have at all times been 
connected, and in a sense dedicated to a public use ... [t]he Public Service Commission in 
ordering the connection of the addition line ... [was] not [acting] under the power of 
eminent domain"); Campbellsville Tel. Co. v. Lebanon, L. & L. Tel. Co., 80 S.W. 1114, 
1117 (Ky. 1904) ("[T]his contract [for interconnection] was not determinable at the will of 
either of the parties to it, but that it must continue during the corporate existence of the two 
companies."). Ifparties have already expended the capital to establish interconnection, there 
can be no takings to require them to continue to exchange messages because presumably 
their rates are designed to recover the costs of their existing networks. See McCardle, 160 
N.E. at 50. 
208. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
209. See id. The following Section argues that the takings test applicable to 
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III. Two ApPROACHES FOR COMPENSATING MANDATORY PHYSICAL 
NETWORK INTERCONNECTION: INTERCARRIER PAYMENTS V. "BILL AND 
KEEP" (ORPIGOU V. COASE) 
It is worthwhile to review where the argument has taken us so far. 
Because large networks have an inherent advantage due to their market 
power and their possible foreclosure strategy, efforts to introduce 
competition in a network industry, like telephony, dominated by a former 
monopolist, probably must to include a regime of mandatory 
interconnection.210 Courts have correctly indicated that telephone 
mandatory interconnection, which involves special interconnection 
facilities, without compensation, is a taking because, as the previous 
Section argues, the general rate may not recover capital investment.211 The 
issue is, therefore, how a carrier must be compensated for this changed 
capital investment. 212 
One answer-which virtually every regulatory regime has adopted-
is that an interconnecting carrier pays for "access.,,213 In other words, as 
discussed above, they must pay for use of the other network.214 For 
instance, under long-distance interconnection, interstate access charges pay 
for twenty-five percent of the costs of the local 100p.215 All intercarrier 
payment regimes require the interconnector to pay for network use; 
whether the tariffs between AT&T and the independents, the long-distance 
access charge regime between the Baby Bells and the long-distance 
companies, the TELRIC methodology under the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996,216 or as discussed in Section IV, the efficient component pricing 
rule (ECPR) recently proposed as a method of compensation for mandatory 
interconnection. 
All of these intercarrier payments misstate the cost of interconnection, 
compensating the wrong costs to avoid a taking.217 Traditional common 
carriage requires one carrier to bring traffic to another on its own dime and 
permits the second carrier to charge the end-user to carry the traffic to its 
interconnection in competitive markets should be whether an interconnection regime allows 
a carrier to charge rates that permit adequate return on capital 
210. See supra Section II.A. 
211. See supra Section II.B. 
212. Id. 
213. See infra Section I1I.A.1. 
214. See id. 
21S. See id. 
216. 47 U.S.C. §§ 2SI(c)(2), 2S1(c)(3), 2S2(d)(I) (2000); Local Competition Order, 
11 F.C.C.R. at IS,843. 
217. See infra Section II I. A. I. 
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destination.218 Railroads would bring freight to each other's terminals, 
ferry boats would bring passengers to docks where they would connect to 
other ferries, etc.219 There would be no intercarrier payments.220 If we 
remember that a common carrier must serve all customers within its area 
and can recover its costs through its general subscribership rate (whether 
that be a phone line rate, a rail freight rate, or a ferry rate), then if traffic is 
brought to its area, it should simply charge its general rate for calls.221 
Mandatory interconnection must only ensure, therefore, the incremental 
cost of establishing physical interconnection is fairly compensated.222 
The challenge then is to provide interconnection regimes that 
compensate networks only the costs of "getting a call" to another 
network.223 The failures of the Telecommunication Act of 1996's 
interconnection regime (or its implementation by the FCC) have led several 
economists to suggest theories of interconnection that purport to do so in an 
economically efficient manner.224 Patrick DeGraba (2000, 2001i25 and 
Jay Atkinson and Christopher Barnekov (2000, 2004i26 have examined 
interconnection regimes in which it is assumed that the both parties share 
the cost of interconnection (these proposals are generically called "bill and 
keep,,).227 The costs of interconnection must be shared because its benefits 
are reciprocal; both networks get larger calling universes.228 DeGraba and 
Atkinson-Barnekov offer two simple "rules-of-thumb" to do so without 
intercarrier payments (these proposals are generically called "bill and 
keep,,).229 
Both the DeGraba and the Atkinson-Barnekov proposals split the cost 
of interconnection on the assumption that the benefits of calls are 
reciprocal; both calling and called parties pay for the call.23o Intercarrier 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 164-168. 
219. See supra Section LA. 
220. /d. 
221. See supra Section LA-B. 
222. [d. 
223. See generally ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 9-15; see DeGraba, 
Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
224. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 1-2; see DeGraba, Central Office Bill, 
supra note 11, at 59-60. 
225. PATRICK DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP AT THE CENTRAL OFFICE AS THE EFFICIENT 
INTERCONNECTION REGIME 1-2 (FCC, Working Paper No. 33, 2000) [hereinafter DEGRABA, 
BILL AND KEEP]; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 40. 
226. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 1; Atkinson & Bamekov, supra note 
174, at 1. 
227. DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP, supra note 225, at 1. 
228. [d. at 7. 
229. [d. at 28; ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 15-16. 
230. DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP, supra note 225, at 2; see ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, 
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payments, from their inception under the Kingsbury Agreement to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, have assumed, to the contrary, that the 
benefits accrue solely to the calling party who should bear all the cost. 231 
The DeGraba and Atkinson-Barnekov proposals have been criticized by 
those who argue that benefit is predominantly unidirectiona1.232 Many 
allege that the calling party benefits exclusively, or largely, from the call 
and, therefore, should pay the lion's share of its cost. 233 
Although there is a healthy academic debate among economists about 
the distribution of benefits from a call and who should pay for these 
benefits, this Article points out that historically both sending and receiving 
parties have paid for communications. For instance, until the mid-
nineteenth century, it was standard for the receiver to pay for mai1.234 Until 
1863 in large towns and 1912 in rural areas, Americans paid for receiving 
mail delivery.235 "Sender-pays" only began to be widespread subsequent 
to the invention of the penny post-an innovation for which the English 
"penny post" reformer Rowland Hill can take credit.236 Hill advocated the 
sender-pay rule largely as a matter of administrative convenience so that 
mail carriers would not have to carry large amounts of cash and could more 
easily collect payment. 237 Hill realized that most costs of a postage system 
are joint and common and it was of little moment whether the receiver or 
sender paid.238 
The exchange of international mail also demonstrates the splitting of 
the cost of communication. From 1874 to 1969, international mail was 
exchanged on a "bill and keep" basis under which one network (the 
sender's national postal service) would collect the fee from the sender 
(through the cost of an international stamp).239 The sender's national 
supra note II, at I. 
231. See MACMEAL, supra note 5, at 204-07; Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 
U.S.c. §§ 151-615b (2000). 
232. E.g., BERNARD HERMALIN & MICHAEL KATZ, NETWORK INTERCONNECTION WITH 
TWO-SIDED USER BENEFITS 2-3 (200 I), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edulhennalinl 
Interconnection_ vI4.pdf. 
233. !d. 
234. James I. Campbell, Jr., An Introduction to the History of Universal Postal Service, 
Presentation at The Future of Universal Postal Service in the United States, The Brookings 
Institution 3, June 18,2002, available at http://www.jcampbell.comlArticles/ 
2002_univ_serv2.pdf(rev. ed. Aug. 8,2002). 
235. Id. at 3-4. 
236. !d.; see also Images of the World, Rowland Hill (1795-1879): Post Office Reform: 
Its Importance and Practicability, at hltp:llimagesoftheworld.orglstamps/rowlandhill.htm 
(last visited Feb. 17,2004). 
237. GEORGE CODDING, THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION 10-11 (1964). 
238. Campbell, supra note 234, at 4. 
239. See Universal Postal Union, Frequently Asked Questions, at 
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postal service would then take the mail to its office in the recipient's 
country.240 The recipient's country's mail service would then deliver for 
free. 241 Similarly, telegrams' recipients tipped the delivery boy and 
nowadays cell phone users pay for both receiving and sending of messages 
(at least in the United States). It is also the way e-mail is exchanged on the 
Internet. Both the e-mail sender and recipient pay for access to an account; 
sending and delivery costs are shared in some manner by each user's ISP, 
and e-mailers pay whether they send or receive. 
The choice between intercarrier payments and these new 
interconnection approaches mirrors the great debate on social cost between 
A.C. Pigou and Ronald Coase.242 The traditional, social welfarist 
approach-espoused by A.c. Pigou in the early part of the last century, 
thus "Pigovian,"-would be to tax one party for the cost "imposed" on the 
other party.243 Thus, the polluter would pay the landowner. Intercarrier 
payments are Pigovian: the regulator attempts to calculate the cost imposed 
by interconnection (the Pigovian "externality") and to assign them to one 
party, in the case of long-distance access charges, the long-distance 
http://www.upu.inUfaq/eniindex.html(last visited Feb. 17, 2004). The modem international 
postal system dates from the creation of the Universal Postal Union pursuant to the Treaty 
of Bern of 1874. Id. 
240. /d. 
241. James L Campbell, Jr., Evolution of Terminal Dues and Remail Provisions in 
European and International Postal Law, in THE LlBERALISATION OF POSTAL SERVICES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 30 (Damien Geradin ed., 2002). For a century, international mail was 
exchanged between countries without access charges. Id. The justification for this 
arrangement was that "every letter elicits a reply" and, therefore, cost and benefit would 
balance eventually, even though the delivery country received no compensation for its 
services. Id. 
In the late I 960s, Third World countries noticed that there was a mail imbalance in that 
they received more mail from the developed world than they sent and, therefore, demanded 
termination payments arguing that their mail system was unfairly burdened. Id. Throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, many Third World countries demanded more and more in termination 
payments, leveraging their control or monopoly of access to mail recipients, often using 
these fees as a revenue source. Id. Eventually, this practice elicited an international reaction 
and effort to curb these fees, or at least ensure that the fees went to improving mail delivery. 
/d. The history of international "termination" payments has remarkable similarities to the 
long-distance access charge dispute discussed below in which small, rural telephone 
companies demanded higher access charges from long-distance companies, leveraging 
access to their customers. See infra Section IILA.I. 
Of course, the reader should see the premise behind the Third World countries' 
position is flawed. Their citizens certainly benefited from receiving international mail. 
These countries could have more efficiently recovered international mail delivery costs from 
the recipients or simply from the domestic postage rate, and given the "increased value" of 
their postal network, it would have been reasonable to expect them to do so. 
242. Atkinson & Barnekov, supra note 174. 
243. A.c. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 369-75 (1912). 
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company; in the case of the Telecommunication Act of 1996's reciprocal 
compensation, the originating carrier.244 
On the other hand, Ronald Coase's famous critique of Pigou would 
suggest an entirely different approach.245 Coase would likely view 
mandatory interconnection as an externality of production-a cost of 
production-like the air pollution from a factory that invades an adjacent 
private party's home.246 As Coase observed, given the regulator's limited 
information, there is a good probability that damages would be calculated 
incorrectly, creating an inefficient result.247 More important, however, 
Coase pointed out that it was arbitrary to choose the polluter automatically 
to bear the cost of its pollution.248 Consider the example of a factory that 
had manufactured its goods for years without complaint, until a kennel for 
highly sensitive, neurasthenic Pomeranian dogs moved next door, and the 
dogs got sick from the emissions. As Coase pointed out, externalities are a 
joint product of "polluter" and "aggrieved party": both the manufacturer 
and the hypochondriacal Pomeranians are "responsible" for the 
externality.249 
Applying this insight to interconnection, it seems absurd to assign the 
cost to one network.25o Both networks benefit from interconnection; both 
are "responsible" for the creation of the cost or externality of 
interconnection.251 Therefore, the assumption of intercarrier payments 
that one party should "pay" for one call's interconnection cost is not 
tenable. Rather, the cost must be shared in some fashion. 
In a Coasian world, parties would be able to negotiate over who 
should bear the externality.252 The manufacturer would find out what it 
would cost to limit his emissions compared to the value of his production, 
and the owner of the Pomeranian dog pound would calculate the cost of 
treating his sick dogs or relocating compared to the cost of ailing dogs.253 
The two would then figure out what the externality was worth to each of 
them and bargain over the most efficient way to bear the costs.254 
The problems for telephony--or any network industry dominated by 
244. See id.; Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2000). 
245. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1,1 (1960). 
246. [d. at I. 
247. [d. at 3. 
248. [d. at 16-18. 
249. [d. at 4. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. [d. at 3-5; Atkinson & Bamekov, supra note 174. 
253. See id. 
254. [d. 
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one firm-is that a dominant firm may have an incentive not to 
interconnect.255 As discussed above, a firm with a dominant position in a 
network industry might have an incentive to engage in vertical foreclosure 
and/or raising their rivals' costs.256 Why? Because the large firm has an 
inherent size-related advantage, which interconnection would destroy.257 
Without interconnection, most people would choose the network with the 
largest calling universe, but with interconnection, all networks would have 
the same sized calling universe.258 
What Coasian deals would firms likely reach if the dominant firm 
could not exercise its market power? The DeGraba and the Atkinson-
Bamekov interconnection proposals try to answer that question, thus this 
Article terms them quasi-Coasian.259 They set forth simple rules to 
apportion the cost of interconnection in light of its benefits and do so 
without intercarrier payments.260 The cost of interconnection is not 
calculated; rather, the default rules attempt to simulate parties' negotiation 
absent market power.261 
The following Section argues that such proposals not only avoid the 
pitfalls and failures of intercarrier payments, but, under a proper 
understanding of network's property rights, do not constitute a taking.262 
They provide compensation-in the form of network benefit-for the 
interconnection costs they impose.263 The Section first describes three 
examples of the failure of Pigovian intercarrier payments, illustrating the 
intractable economic and political problems they present.264 It then 
describes both the DeGraba and Atkinson-Bamekov proposals, showing 
that they are not takings.265 
A. Pigovian Interconnection: Long Distance Access Charges, Reciprocal 
Compensation, and Long Distance Termination Charges 
Intercarrier payments suffer from fundamental problems. As 
255. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 42-43. 
256. Jd.; see also note 192. 
257. [d. 
258. See id. 
259. [d. at 40-41; ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 1. 
260. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 1; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra 
note 11, at 40-41. 
261. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 22; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, 
supra note 11, at 50-51. 
262. See infra Section lILA. 
263. [d. 
264. See infra Section lILA. 1-3. 
265. See supra Section I1LB; ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 3-7; DeGraba, 
Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 40. 
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DeGraba has pointed out, intercarrier payments can be gamed through 
regulatory arbitrage, i.e., a service can change its regulatory label and avoid 
intercarrier payments.266 This occurred with private lines over which 
businesses would transfer calls from office to office, across state lines, and 
thereby avoid intercarrier payments and is occurring now with IP telephony 
that makes long distance and international calls without paying access 
charges or settlement charges, respective1y.267 Second, intercarrier 
payments confer a termination monopoly on local exchanges.268 Because 
the local exchange has exclusive control over access to its customers, they 
can "hold them hostage," leveraging their control by charging high 
termination charges to those long-distance companies that wish to hand-off 
traffic.269 Third, under intercarrier payments, per minute rates recover flat 
costs, creating intractable problems of cost allocation.27o Finally, they 
require one party to pay for the communication when both clearly 
benefit.271 
In short, intercarrier payments demonstrate many of the problems of 
Pigovian use taxes that Coase adumbrated: they arbitrarily choose one 
party to bear the cost of the externality of interconnection. Regulators lack 
the information to properly calculate the cost of an externality.272 Indeed, 
intercarrier payments-with their recovery of costs that vary little, if at all, 
with traffic volume, through a per minute, variable cost structure--create 
an inherently flawed regime that no amount of information could remedy: 
price is higher than marginal cost leading to endemic under-usage.273 They 
have become, as the public choice theorists might maintain, a powerful 
vehicle for regulatory deal making and rent abstraction.274 
1. Long Distance Access Charges and the Allocation of Joint and 
Common Costs 
AT&T used its long-distance revenue to subsidize local service, 
through its internal, intra-corporate revenue and settlement accounting 
266. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 45. 
267. [d. at 45-46. 
268. [d. at 47. 
269. See id. at 47-48. 
270. /d. 
271. [d. 
272. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 48. 
273. [d. at 47-48. 
274. Perhaps with a shrug of Gallic understatement, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean 
Tirole state that interconnection regimes "must reflect multiple objectives." JEAN-JACQUES 
LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 98 (2000). 
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system.275 A sort of interconnection regime, the accounting system 
assigned some of the local exchange network's costs under the long-
distance interstate jurisdiction, and revenue from interstate long-distance 
was therefore booked to the local and intrastate networks.276 AT&T's 
motivation for this highly complex manipulation was largely political.277 
State utilities commissions exerted enormous political pressures on AT&T 
to lower local rates.278 This manipulation of accounting allowed AT&T to 
deliver lower local rates at the expense of long-distance rates.279 This 
created a tug-of-war from the 1930s to the 1960s, between federal and state 
regulators over the extent of local and intra.state subsidization.28o By the 
1970s, this subsidization was expanded so that urban rates subsidized rural 
rates. 281 
In the 1970s, thanks to the MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC 
decision of Judge Skelly Wright, this system received a shock; Mel was 
permitted to enter long distance competition.282 Mel's Execunet service 
was quite simple, allowing businesses to cheaply call offices in different 
states and avoid expensive long-distance access charges.283 Essentially, 
Mel had a local number in one city and another in a second, distant city.284 
A subscriber to Mel's service would call its local number in the first city 
on AT&T lines, Mel would then forward the call on its own lines to the 
distant city, without access charges, and use its local line to place the call 
on the local network.285 
What rate Mel would pay for access to the still-monopolized local 
network was an issue the Fee had to decide.286 Mel claimed it should pay 
only the rates for two local lines.287 AT&T alleged that the access rate 
should reflect the various subsidies that long-distance bore on behalf of the 
275. RICHARD GABEL, DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATIONS PRINCIPLES IN THE TELEPHONE 
INDUSTRY 35-45 (1974). 
276. ld. at 55. 
277. See id. 
278. ld. 
279. /d. at 43-44. 
280. ld. at 155-61. 
281. See BROCK supra note 5, at 68-70. The AT&T subsidization of rural rates began 
in the 1970s with the "Ozark Plan" under which "separations rules divided expenses in 
accordance with usage measurements but applied weighting factors that assigned costs to 
the interstate jurisdiction at a far higher rate than would be determined through strict 
proportional usage." [d. at 190. 
282. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 367 (1977). 
283. /d. at 367-68. 
284. ld. at 367. 
285. BROCK, supra note 5, at 136-37. 
286. ld. at 139. 
287. ld. 
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local network.288 The parties could not agree, and the FCC could not 
decide the matter.289 
As a result of this quagmire, the exchange network facilities for 
interstate access or ENFIA tariffs were negotiated between AT&T, MCI, 
and the FCC. 290 This negotiated settlement did not represent an effort to 
identify the costs incremental to interconnection but were a political 
negotiation.291 Under the tariffs, it was determined that the "new 
competitors would pay 35% of the AT&T [cost allocation] so long as their 
total revenues (as a group) were below $110 million per year; 45% when 
their total revenues were between $110 and $250 million; and 55% when 
total revenues were between $250 and $375 million.,,292 
After the AT&T divestiture in 1984, the Commission devised the 
access charge regime to replace the ENFIA tariffs and govern the 
relationship between AT&T, MCI, and the new local monopolists, the 
Baby Bells.293 Unlike the ENFIA tariffs, which never purported to be 
anything more than a negotiated deal,294 the access charge regime 
attempted to recreate the subsidy flows of the original AT&T.295 
This system of Byzantine complexity, however, did not identify the 
costs incremental to interconnection.296 Rather, it simply refined the pre-
existing assumptions about subsidy and access that had existed under the 
AT&T monopoly.297 While the long-distance company paid for access to 
the local lines, the local network did not pay for access to long-distance 
networks, an odd result given the mutuality of network benefit.298 Further, 
the rates long-distance companies paid were as arbitrary as the ENFIA 
tariffs because they did not attempt to recover the cost incremental to 
interconnection.299 The twenty-five percent of the cost of the local line 
was simply declared to be interstate,300 and this cost in the 1980s was 
capped at $3.50 and named the Subscriber Line Charge, or SLC, a flat 
288. [d. 
289. [d. 
290. [d. at 140. 
291. [d. 
292. [d. at 140-42. 
293. [d. at 173-74. 
294. [d. at 140. 
295. See [d. at 195-96. 
296. See id. at 190-91, 195-98. 
297. [d. at 195-96. 
298. See id. at 176. 
299. See id. at 190-91, 195-98. 
300. [d. at 190; see also [n re MTS and WATS Market Structure, 93 FCC 2d 241 
(1983). 
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rate.301 In high cost areas, this level of the SLC has been increased over 
time.302 To the extent that the SLC failed to recover the twenty-five 
percent of line cost, there was a per minute charge on inter-exchange 
carriers, or long distance carriers, called the Carrier Common Line, later 
evolving into flat charge called the PICC.303 
This process of subsidization has quite naturally produced bizarre 
results; indeed, results that display all the unpleasant fruits of Pigovian 
taxation. The access charge system disadvantaged long-distance 
companies, which had to pay for interconnection while the all LECs simply 
received payment-a result that became unfair with the passage of the 1996 
Act and emergence of head-to-head competition between the long-distance 
companies and the LECs.304 While payments to the LECs have been 
reduced over the years, access charges continue to constitute an enormous 
subsidy, particularly to rural telephone companies.305 Even a brief glance 
at the annual statement of the United States Telephone Association, the 
trade group of local telephone companies, shows an enormous reliance on 
access charges.306 Many companies report receiving more than half of 
their revenue from these charges.307 Finally, the averaging of access 
charge rates means that this subsidy is not paid specifically by those calling 
"high cost" customers, but by everyone. 
Attempts to reform the system have failed to correct the access charge 
system's central economic flaws.308 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
mandated reform of the access charge regime and did have some positive 
effects.309 Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the 
FCC to establish an "explicit" system of universal service support to 
replace the existing system of implicit subsidies.3lO Consequently, the 
301. BROCK, supra note 5, at 191; see also In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, 93 
FCC 2d at 278; In re Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, 16,010 (May 16, (997) .. 
302. BROCK, supra note 5, at 190; see also In re Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. at 
16,010-11. 
303. Id.; In re Access Charge Reform, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 12,964-65, 12,986-88 (May 
31,2000). 
304. See BROCK, supra note 5, at 183. 
305. See id. 
306. UNITED STATES TEL. ASS'N, AN~UAL STATEMENT app. C (2001); see also National 
Telecommunications Cooperative Association, Bill & Keep: Is it Rightfor Rural America?, 
at http://www.ntca.org/contentdocuments/Final%20White%20Paper"102003.04.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2004) ("The NTCA data request ... shows that on average, 26.6% of the 
rural ILEC's total company revenues are derived from state and interstate access charges."). 
307. Id. 
308. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2000). 
309. See id. 
310. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000). Section 254 reflects Congress' understanding that such 
implicit subsidies are incompatible with a competitive regime because, given a choice of 
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CCL and its successor, the PICC, were phased out for some users in· favor 
of an explicit universal subsidy. 3ll (The subsidy started as a roughly seven 
percent "contribution" on users based on all telecommunications 
service.)3l2 
Nonetheless, the system's internal contradictions seem to have 
doomed it. Access charges depend upon an arbitrary assignment of the joint 
and common cost of interconnection on long-distance.3l3 As a result, 
regulated long distance is overpriced and alternatives like wireless and IP 
telephony are eroding its market share.3l4 This, in tum, lowers the 
subsidies flowing from long-distance service creating pressure for higher 
access charges that, in tum, will simply further erode its market share.3l5 
2. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, TELRIC, and the 
Allocation of Joint and Common Costs 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996's implementing regulations 
applied an interconnection pricing regime known as TELRIC, developed 
for unbundled network elements (UNEs) to govern interconnection 
between the incumbent local telephone companies (Baby Bells or ILECs) 
and the new competitive local telephone companies (CLECs).3l6 Unlike 
the access charge regime that never claimed to try to recreate a market-
based system of interconnection but instead were based on book value with 
local providers, customers would not elect to pay the above-cost prices that support 
traditional implicit subsidy mechanisms. See id.; H.R. REp. No. 104-204, at 80 (1995) 
(recognizing the need to evaluate universal service mechanisms "in the context of a local 
market changing from one characterized by monopoly to one of competition"). 
311. In re Access Charge Reform, 15 F.C.C.R. at 12,986, 13,002-07. 
312. !d. at 13,021. This rate has been rising. It is now 8.7%. See Federal 
Communications Commission, Public Notice, Proposed Second Quarter 2004 Universal 
Service Contribution Factor, CC Docket No. 96-45 (Mar. 5, 2004) ("the proposed universal 
service contribution factor for the Second Quarter of 2004 is .087 or 8.7 percent"). 
313. See DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 43-44. 
314. Id. at 39-40. 
315. Id.; see Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy, Tutorial on the Universal Service 
Contribution Methodology Proceeding at the NARUC Summer Meeting in Portland, Oregon 
(July 29, 2002). Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy stated: 
For carriers with declining interstate revenues, this means that they must recover 
their contribution costs from a smaller revenue base than the one used for 
assessment purposes. This is the primary reason why AT&T charges its 
residential customers more than 11 % of its monthly bills, rather than the 7.3% 
contribution factor .... As total revenues fall, the percentage factor must increase 
to ensure sufficient funding for universal service. 
Abernathy, supra. 
316. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c}(2)-(3) (2000); Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 
15,816-56. 
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averaged, distributed costs, TELRIC was an explicit effort to create an 
efficient system of interconnection.317 TELRIC failed to produce non-
controversial pricing.318 Interestingly, it is hardly clear from the statute 
that the same pricing standard was meant to govern both UNEs and 
interconnection and, arguably, interconnection only recovers direct cost 
(not long-range incremental cost).319 
In any case, TELRIC attempted to simulate the price that two 
interconnecting carriers would pay for UNEs under competitive market 
conditions, with certain caveats.320 Microeconomics holds that in 
competitive markets, prices move to incremental cost, i.e., prices reflect the 
cost of producing the "nth" item of output, regardless of historical, sunk 
COSt. 321 TELRIC aimed to isolate the long-range (long enough to treat all 
costs as variable and avoidable) incremental cost for providing a particular 
calling element.322 On reviewing the legality of TELRIC under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, the Supreme Court describes the process in 
the following way: 
Assume that it would cost $1 a year to operate a most-efficient 
loop element; that it would take $10 for interest payments on the 
capital a carrier would have to invest to build the lowest cost loop 
centered upon an incumbent carrier's existing wire centers (say 
$100, at 10 percent per annum); and that $9 would be reasonable 
for depreciation on that loop (an eleven-year useful life); then the 
annual TELRIC for the loop element would be $20.323 
Despite the sophistication of this approach, TELRIC prices developed 
all the problems of Pigovian taxation, at least when applied to 
interconnection.324 First, it assumed somewhat arbitrarily that one party 
317. See id. 
318. In fact, TELRIC has received quite harsh criticism. E.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. 
Gregory Sidak. A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks, I 09 YALE LJ. 417 (1999). 
319. Compare 47 U.S.c. § 252(d)(I)(A) (stating that the rate for interconnection and 
UNEs shaB be "based on cost") with 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii) (cost shaB be based on "a 
reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such caBs"). The statute 
does not define "additional cost." However, the only other place "additional cost" is used in 
the Act is in Section 224(d)(I), the pole attachment section (the rate should recover "not less 
than the additional costs of providing pole attachments"). 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1). Here, the 
meaning is clearly direct, incremental cost, consistent with the biB and keep theory. See id. 
320. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,816-15,856. 
321. See CABRAL, supra note 194, at 20. 
322. Local Competition Order, II F.C.C.R. at 15,851. 
323. Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,496 (2002). 
324. PIGOU, supra note 243, at 369-75. This discussion is primarily aimed at the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996's interconnection requirements not its unbundling 
requirements. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); compare § 251(c), with § 251(d). 
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benefits exclusively from interconnection, i.e., the calling party.325 As 
pointed out, this is a highly questionable assumption.326 Second, as with 
access charges, it recovered the wrong costs for interconnection from the 
wrong parties, aiming to recover, not the costs incremental to 
interconnection, but the cost of providing, on a long-term basis, 
interconnection services from other carriers, not end-users.327 
TELRIC also results in the inability by regulators to set correct 
interconnection prices because, like the traffic sensitive portion of access 
charges, TELRIC does not recover costs in a manner in which they are 
incurred because it requires a per minute recovery of costs that do not vary 
with minutes.328 This gave the state commissions the impossible task of 
. assigning joint and common costs to each unit of production, i.e., each 
minute of phone call. It is a staple of microeconomics that it is an arbitrary 
exercise to apply joint and common costs to each output.329 To use an 
example, it is arbitrary to assign any particular portion of the $1000 fixed 
and common costs to any unit of production. Consider the diverse prices 
for plane tickets, also a product with high joint and common costs (the 
airplane, the crew, the jet fuel) and low incremental cost (the extra lunch, 
the glass of Coke, the smidgen of additional fuel and baggage handling). 
The difference between unlimited business class fares and tourist class, 
three-month, non-refundable fares represents, in a rough way, the 
flexibility producers should have in allocating portions of joint and 
common costs onto individual units of production. 
Of course, people's first inclination is simply to average joint and 
common costs over each output, and, in extremely rough terms, this is how 
most intercarrier payment regimes originally calculated prices. To 
determine a per minute cost of interconnection, the incumbent Bells 
calculated the average length of the phone call and then assigned an 
average cost to each minute.33o Because it was assumed that calls between 
any given pair of carriers would be roughly equal in number, it was also 
assumed that any given pair of carriers would break-even as far as the costs 
of interconnection.33I The Bells, who had the most customers, probably 
thought they had the advantage under this system as they would terminate 
most of their calls, and their competitors, the CLECs, would have to pay 
325. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,816-15,856. 
326. See supra notes 223-233 and accompanying text. 
327. Id 
328. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,877-79. 
329. CABRAL, supra note 194, at 20-21. 
330. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 at 15,903, 16,038. 
331. Id. at 15,903, 16,040-41. 
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the Bells for tennination.332 Further, the Bells benefited from the largely 
wireless traffic pattern that predominated in the 1990s. The Bells lobbied 
Congress and later the Commission to require intercarrier compensation.333 
The Internet revolution dramatically revealed the limitations of this 
approach. Remember that the TELRIC interconnection rates were per 
minute. Thus, if a carrier served a customer who only received long calls 
(that originated on other networks) and never made any calls, such a carrier 
would make a mint because the additional cost of each minute of calling 
was next to zero, but the per minute cost was significant (especially if there 
were a lot of minutes). The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 coincided with the mushrooming of dial-up Internet access; traffic 
that was of long duration and unidirectional.334 If, therefore, a CLEC were 
to serve an ISP, the interconnecting ILEC would have to pay for calls at 
TELRIC rates that the CLEC tenninated.335 These calls were long, and the 
ISPs didn't call people back.336 Several CLECs made a huge amount of 
money.337 The Bells claimed, at one time, that they were losing between 
$2 and $3 billion a year from such traffic, an odd claim because they were 
still receiving large "reciprocal compensation" from wireless traffic.338 To 
remedy this supposed injustice, the Commission attempted to change the 
rules, but it proved rather difficult to carve out ISP traffic from the 
statutory compensation regime.339 The District of Columbia Circuit 
remanded the Commission's order and then remanded the subsequent order 
on remand.34o 
332. Id. at 15,903, 16,036, 16,038-44. 
333. See also Donny Jackson, The Feeling's Mutual, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Sept. 25, 
2000, at http://telephonyonline.comlar/telecomjeelings_mutual/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2004). 
334. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 
F.C.C.R. 9151, 9181-84 (Apr. 27,2001). . 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. See id. 
338. See id.; see also Atkinson & Bamekov, supra note 174, at 3; see also Letter ofW. 
Scott Randolph, Verizon Communications, to Magalie R. Salas, Secretary, FCC, C.c. 
Docket No. 99-68 (November 1, 2000) (stating incumbent LEC payments to competitive 
LECs rose from small amounts to over $2 billion annually). The fact that the incumbents 
were net recipients of wireline to wireless reciprocal compensation is supported by the 
recent Sprint petition. In this petition, Sprint received the right to charge higher rates for 
reciprocal compensation than wireline companies. See In re Cost-Based Terminating 
Compensation for CMRS Providers, 18 F.C.C.R. 18,441 (Sept. 3, 2003). Rather than 
charge these rates, Sprint has simply opted for bill and keep interconnection agreements. 
See Atkinson & Bamekov, supra note 174, at 27. 
339. See Bell Ati. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
340. Id. at 3; WoridCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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3. Termination Monopoly: CLEC Termination Charges 
Another problem with access charges is that they give all local 
carriers market power over terminating access--or, at least, the incentive to 
push for as high as possible rates. 341 Interconnecting originating networks, 
either CLECs or long distance companies, must use the called party's 
carrier to place a call to such customer. 342 In other words, "each 
terminating carrier, no matter how small, has a monopoly over termination 
to its own customers.,,343 All other carriers that wish to reach these 
customers must first "pay" the terminating carrier for the privilege.344 The 
terminating carrier will therefore use its market power to extract as much as 
it can from the other carriers.345 These high prices will neither be paid by 
the receiving subscriber nor, due to federal averaging regulations, will they 
be directly paid by the calling party.346 Rather, the cost will be spread over 
all the subscribers of the calling party's network, insulating the terminating 
carrier from feeling the effects in market demand elasticity that charging 
monopolist terminating rates to end-users might induce.347 This problem 
exists (to a lesser degree because of non-averaging) with termination fees 
in international mail,348 international settlement charges for international 
calling,349 and CLEC terminating access charges under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.350 
The emergence of this market power is a direct result of the common 
law takings assumption that each network is supposedly independent and 
has the right to compensation from the interconnecting carrier. Under 
simple "hand off' interconnection, the carrier could not leverage its access 
against other carriers, and this problem did not exist. If the terminating 
341. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 47. 
342. Id. 
343. Id.; see also In re Access Charge Reform, II F.C.C.R. 21,354,21,472 (Dec. 24, 
1996) ("[T]erminating access may remain a bottleneck created whichever LEC provides 
[terminating] access for a particular customer [even if competitors have entered the 
market]."). 
344. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 44. 
345. See id. at 44-47. 
346. See Noel D. Uri, Monopoly Power and the Problem ojCLEC Access Charges, 25 
TELECOMM. POLICY 611, 614-15 (2001). 
347. Id. 
348. See Campbell, supra note 241, at 30. 
349. Kiser & Collins, supra note 109, at 35-27. "Despite an aggressive effort by the 
FCC to bring international accounting rates closer to cost, many cOlHltries continue to 
subsidize domestic phone service by allowing monopoly providers to charge 
disproportionately high settlement rates for incoming international calls (generally paid by 
U.S. long-distance companies)." Id. at 35. 
350. Uri, supra note 346, at 613. 
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carrier wanted to charge high rates, it would have to charge them to end-
users, and thus would face the competitive consequences of its actions. If 
carriers charged high prices for termination, they would face competitive 
pressures directly from wireless and Internet providers. Consumers would 
be aware of and pay the full prices for calls and could exert pressure to 
lower the price or reduce their calls to these "hostages." Intercarrier 
payments, on the other hand, allow carriers to shift the cost of their 
networks onto other subscribers, average the cost among all of the 
subscribers, and thereby permit carriers to avoid the full competitive impact 
of their excessive access pricing. 
B. Quasi-Coasian Interconnection: Another Way? 
The costs that intercarrier payments must recover in order to avoid a 
taking are the cost of physical facilities incremental to interconnection and 
the cost incremental to a particular phone call. The following Section 
shows: (i) how the first costs can be recovered through the added benefits 
that interconnection provides, and (ii) how the second type of cost should 
be recovered through end-user rates, not intercarrier compensation, thereby 
avoiding the pitfalls of Pigovian interconnection. 
Interconnection has benefits and costs; thus in an ideal situation, e.g., 
one without market power and the tipping effect, there would be no need 
for regulation.351 Parties would only interconnect when both benefit.352 
This is, to a large degree, how the Internet backbone works.353 
Then how, in a non-ideal world, i.e., one in which there is an 
incumbent monopolist with a huge amount of market power, would it be 
possible to recreate the deal that would have been made in the absence of 
that market power?354 Such a recreation would balance the benefit of 
interconnection with its costs and provide an interconnection solution that 
the parties would likely have negotiated in the absence of market power, 
i.e., the Coasian solution.355 In other words, assuming strong property 
rights over networks (access charges blur property rights), how would 
parties negotiate over network interconnection? It is arguable that such 
parties would split the cost of interconnection. This "recreation" uses the 
351. See MICHAEL KEN DE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET 
BACKBONES I, 5 (Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 32, 2000), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working....Papers/oppwp32.doc ("[P]eering partners 
exchange traffic on a settlements-free basis."). 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. See Atkinson & Barnekov, supra note 174, at 5. 
355. See id. 
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split as a default rule which would be the starting point for negotiations.356 
Notice that this solution does not involve setting a price.357 It simply 
involves splitting the burden of interconnection in proportion to its 
benefit. 358 Without pricing issues, these regimes avoid many of the pitfalls 
discussed above for Pigovian interconnection.359 The regulator does not 
have to calculate cost or allocate fixed costs to particular outputs.360 
Recently, two proposals have been forwarded that do precisely that. 
DeGraba (2000) recommends that carriers be obligated to bring traffic, on 
their own dime, to the other carrier's central office.361 DeGraba (2002) 
modifies this proposal, requiring carriers to arrive at an agreed upon meet 
point (interconnection point) and bear the costs of building their networks 
to such point.362 Atkinson and Barnekov (2000) simply state that as an 
initial default subsequent to negotiation, the incremental cost of 
interconnection be split.363 The motivating idea behind both proposals is 
that interconnection provides a clear benefit to both carriers.364 It increases 
both networks' calling universe, thereby increasing the value of each 
network and presumably allows carriers to charge more for subscription.365 
If the burdens of interconnection were balanced with its benefits, then no 
intercarrier payments would be necessary and no takings issues would 
emerge.366 
DeGraba begins with the assumption that a call benefits both parties 
equally and, that ideally, the call should be priced to each party at one half 
of its incremental cost in order to achieve maximum efficlency.367 Given 
the difficulty of figuring out the cost incremental to interconnection, 
regulators should simply require that each carrier would be responsible for 
bringing traffic to each other's central office,368 or another meet point;369 
356. !d. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. See id. at 5-6. 
360. See id. 
361. DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP, supra note 225, at 8. 
362. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 84. 
363. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note II, at ii. 
364. Id. at ii; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 84. 
365. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note II, at ii; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra 
note II, at 84. 
366. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note II, at ii; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, 
supra note II, at 84. 
367. DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP, supra note 225, at 18 (citing ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 65-70 (1970». 
368. DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note II, at 76-78. 
369. Id. at 76-77. 
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and afterwards the network would be responsible for carrying the traffic to 
its customers.370 Costs would be recovered through end-users.371 
Atkinson and Bamekov argue that the default rule that costs 
incremental to interconnection should be split equally between 
interconnectors.372 Rather than concentrate on DeGraba's notion that the 
benefit is mutual and, therefore, its cost should be split, they concentrate on 
benefits that network effects provide.373 They show that splitting the cost 
incremental to interconnection has an interesting result under certain 
assumptions; ceteris paribus interconnection's cost per subscriber on both 
networks will become equal under this rule.374 
Their model is quite straightforward and worth examining.375 They 
start with two networks.376 The links do not represent wires, but, rather, 
the work or cost that interconnection involves.377 They term them 
"urlinks.,,378 The "0" Network has only one urlink.379 The "X" network 
has four. 38o 
X 1----------X
2 
.................................... X 3 ----------)4 
The rule for distributing urlinks is simple. 01 must talk to 02.381 Thus: 
0 1----------02 
370. Id. 
371. See generally DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP, supra note 225, at 8; see generally 
DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 76-78. 
372. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 12-16. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. Id.at9-I5. 
376. Id. 
377. Id. 
378. Id. at 9. 
379. Id.at9-I5. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. 
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With the "X" network, maximum usage (everyone talking in the most 
resource-demanding way on the network) requires urlinks between Xl and 
X4.382 This requires three urlinks (the completed lines):383 
_____ X2 _____ X3 _____ X4 
In addition, if X2 wishes to talk to X3, there must be another urlink (the 
dotted line).384 These connection facilities enable any possible 
combination of simultaneous conversations of the X network. 
____ X2 ____ X3 ____ ~ 
Now examine the urlink/size of network relationship. For the "0" network, 
each subscriber must bear 0.5 urlinks; for the "X" network, each subscriber 
must bear I urlinks.385 Thus, the "X" network is more expensive as it 
should be because the X network is bigger and more powerful, i.e., X offers 
a larger callable universe.386 Now, mandate interconnection between the 
"X" network and the "0" network.387 At its "worst case scenario," Xl 
calls 02 (shown by the straight line):388 
___ X2 ___ X3 __ _ 
X2 calls 01 (shown by the dotted line):389 
X3 must speak to X4 (shown by the dash-dot line):39o 
382. /d. 
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. /d. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
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Interconnection, therefore, requires four extra urlinks.391 If, following the 
Atkinson-Barnekov rule, one simply splits these incremental urlinks, then 
the X network will have six urlinks/four subscribers and the 0 network 
three urlinks/two subscribers.392 A significant feature is that by assigning 
each network half of the costs incremental to interconnection, each network 
has the same burden per subscriber, i.e., 1.5 urlinks per subscriber.393 
Both the DeGraba and Atkinson-Barnekov proposals split in some 
proportion the burden of establishing interconnection and then provide an 
intercarrier payment of zero, i.e., eliminate intercarrier payments.394 Each 
network would bear the cost of establishing interconnection in proportion 
to the benefit it received.395 Small companies, which receive greater 
benefit, would pay more (per subscriber) than larger networks on the 
ground that they benefit more.396 Thus, under Atkinson-Bamekov, carriers 
would split the cost of interconnection regardless of their size.397 Smaller 
carriers would thereby bear the same burden as large networks, on the 
theory that they benefit more through interconnection than do larger 
networks, i.e., they gain a greater increase in callable universe.398 
It bears pointing out that the Internet interconnects in a way predicted 
by DeGraba and Atkinson-Barnekov.399 The Internet backbone, which 
carries all Internet traffic, is a largely unregulated network consisting of 
numerous interconnecting networks, called backbone providers, like 
UUNET and Genuity.4oo End-users acquire access through phone lines 
(DSL or dial-up) or the cable system, which connects with Internet service 
providers (ISPS).401 ISPs, in tum, connect with the Internet backbone, 
which consists of optic fiber cables that span the globe.402 The networks in 
390. [d. 
391. [d. 
392. [d. 
393. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 7-10. 
394. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 6; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra 
note 11, at 63. 
395. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 6; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra 
note 11, at 63. 
396. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 6; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra 
note 11, at 63. 
397. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note 11, at 24. 
398. /d. 
399. /d. at 6, 27-28; DeGraba, Central Office Bill, supra note 11, at 39, 44-46. 
400. KENDE, supra note 351, at 1-5. 
401. /d. 
402. See id. at 1-7. 
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the backbone interconnect under "peering" or "transit" agreements.403 
Under peering arrangements, backbone providers interconnect for free; 
under transit agreements, they pay for interconnection (a flat fee).404 
As predicted by theory, Internet backbone providers will peer with 
other providers if the providers are roughly equal in size, geographic scope, 
and traffic volume.405 As Atkinson and Barnekov would suggest, 
equivalently sized networks bear an equivalent amount of the burden of 
establishing interconnection and derive equivalent benefits from such 
interconnection.406 If the networks are dissimilar, the larger network will 
demand a fee.407 This fee reflects perhaps the greater benefit that the 
smaller network receives from interconnection and the concomitant ability 
to extract this benefit.408 However, anything definite about transit 
agreements is difficult to say, largely because unlike peering arrangements, 
which are available on the web,409 their provisions are confidential.410 
Finally, on a slightly more speculative note, it appears that bill and 
keep might be adopted by all large carriers-and, in effect, end the access 
charge system-as a result of the "disruptive" technology of voice- over IP 
telephony. Only recently have companies like Von age started to offer IP 
telephony long distance calls. They use the Internet to bypass the long-
distance telephone networks-and thus avoid access charges. Reeling from 
this competitive threat, the large telephone companies are currently in 
negotiation about an appropriate intercarrier payment system. It seems 
likely that they will adopt bill and keep, with accommodation made for the 
rural telephone companies that, as discussed above, rely so heavily on 
access charges. 411 
IV. INTERCONNECTION AND THE EFFICIENT COMPONENT PRICING RULE 
1. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber and, more recently, 
Christopher Y 00, have advocated the application of the efficient 
component-pricing rule (ECPR) for access to incumbent monopolists' 
403. See id. at 4-7. 
404. Id. 
405. See MCI, WoridCom Policy for Settlement-Free Interconnection with Internet 
Networks, at http://globa1.mci.comJuunet/peeringl (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (setting forth 
geographic scope, build out requirements, and traffic requirements for peering). 
406. ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, supra note II, at ii. 
407. See id. at ii. 
408. Id. 
409. E.g., id. 
410. See KENDE, supra note 351, at 4-7. 
411. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT DAILY at I (Feb. 27, 2004). 
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networks.412 Their thesis, which they have elaborated extensively in a 
book413 and in numerous articles,414 asserts that incumbents should recover 
not only the cost of providing service when selling access to competitors or 
renting use of their network facilities pursuant to the Telecommunication 
Act of 1996's unbundling requirements,415 but the opportunity cost as 
well.416 Opportunity costs are those incurred whenever one network uses a 
second, and that use deprives the second carrier of the opportunity to obtain 
other revenue.417 Spulber and Yoo argue, therefore, that "the correct price 
of those network elements depends on what the company could have 
obtained by selling network services.'>418 What a regulated monopolist 
"could have" obtained without a competitor, however, is, as critics 
maintain, the "full pre-entry profits, all the way up to the full monopoly 
level.'>419 (Or as Spulber and Yoo state "the opportunity cost calculation 
can be based on the regulated rates for the incumbent firm's output. ,,)420 
Spulber and Y 00 recently applied this idea to takings and mandatory 
interconnection, arguing that mandatory interconnection is (i) a physical, 
per se taking, and that (ii) such takings can only be compensated with the 
market value of the network or the ECPR price.42I Their proposal relies on 
a pricing theory that is not universally accepted. Further, this Article's 
analysis would suggest that Spulber and Yoo misidentify the mandatory 
412. SIDAK & SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT, 
supra note 13, at 13; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 904. 
413. SIDAK & SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT, 
supra note 13, at 13. 
414. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 885, 906; Sidak & Spulber, Deregulation, supra 
note 13, at 119; Sidak & Spulber, Givings, Takings, supra note 13, at 1079; Sidak & 
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 13, at 855. 
415. See 47 U.S.c. § 251(c)(3) (2000). 
416. Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 13, at 856-58; SIDAK & 
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT, supra note 13, at 13. 
417. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 902-03, 906-13. 
418. Id. at 903. 
419. Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE 
WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHOLOGIES 
144 (A. Shapine, ed. 2003), available 'at http://raven.stern.nyu.edulnetworks/tragic.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR]; 
see also Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 
678-79 (1996); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection 
Pricing: How Efficient is the 'Efficient Component Pricing Rule'?, ANTITRUST BULL. 557, 
560-63 (1995). 
420. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 906. This, of course, begs the question of 
whether regulated monopolies obtain monopolistic prices. See id. It seems at least possible, 
perhaps highly possible, that, given regulatory capture and information dissymmetry 
between regulators and the regulated, regulated rates are a bit higher than competitive rates. 
421. Id. at 933-35, 980-1002. 
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interconnection taking issue as a physical invasion; its potential regulatory 
taking is far more important. This leads them arguably to misidentify the 
proper measure for compensation. Finally, to the extent Spulber and Yoo 
rely on ECPR, their proposal has all the problems of intercarrier payments; 
it identifies the wrong costs to compensate and recovers such costs in an 
inherently inefficient manner. 
A. Economic and Legal Objections to ECPR 
The ECPR has received significant academic criticism, and the 
Supreme Court rejected it in an Administrative Procedure Act challenge to 
TELRIC.422 The economic critique suggests that ECPR is not necessary to 
achieve allocative efficiency and is likely to achieve the opposite.423 Under 
ECPR, entrants pay a price for interconnection (or any use of the network, 
such as unbundled network elements as required by the Telecommunication 
Act of 1996424) that reflects the "full monopoly profits of the incumbent" 
including the incumbent's private opportunity costs.425 ECPR, its 
advocates allege, is efficient because it prevents inefficient entry; a new 
entrant will not survive unless the entrant is equally efficient, or more 
efficient than the incumbent.426 
One major problem with ECPR is that it confuses private with social 
opportunity cost. Nicholas Economides, a leading academic in the field of 
network economics, explains the difference: 
Suppose that two companies, X and Yare competing for the 
business of customer C, which is worth $C to each of them. 
Assume that X and Yare equally cost efficient in serving C. If 
customer C used to buy from X and now buys from Y, firm X's 
private opportunity cost is $C. However, the social opportunity 
cost of the switch of customer C from X to Y is exactly zero, 
since society does not gain or lose from customer C's change of 
carrier. Essentially, since firm X's loss was firm V's gain, private 
opportunity costs and gains canceled each other, and the social 
cost of customer C's change of carrier is zero.427 
422. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 511-14 (2002). 
423. Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 142-45. 
424. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000); Local Competition Order, II F.C.C.R. at 15,842-43 
(Aug. 8, 1996). 
425. Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 143-44. 
426. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 914-16, 993. 
427. Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 142-43. 
In addition to favoring one group's opportunity costs over another's, Jim Chen makes an 
additional point that the ECPR tends to favor past generations in favor of present ones. Jim 
Chen, A New Regulatory Regime for Federal-State Relations and Universal Service 
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The private cost to an incumbent monopolist includes the cost of the lost 
customer. Mandatory interconnection does inflict such a loss to the 
monopolist, because it expected to have a monopolized market in which to 
sell its goods. But, the incumbent suffers this loss, not society as a whole; 
therefore, there is no economic reason (from the perspective of total net 
social welfare) why ECPR should be mandated. Further, no economic 
mathematical model has yet demonstrated that non-ECPR prices will 
prevent inefficient entrance or other dynamic inefficiencies.428 
To the contrary, the ECPR rule is arguably inefficient and discourages 
efficient entry as opposed to protecting against inefficient entry, because by 
requiring entrants to ensure the incumbent's monopolist profits, it "locks 
in" the incumbent's inefficiencies.429 The entrant must ensure that the 
incumbent maintain its profits at its given level of monopolistic 
inefficiency.43o 
Sidak and Spulber also advance a legal argument for the necessity of 
monopolist opportunity costs in interconnection pricing.431 They argue that 
a "regulatory contract" exists between the regulated utility and the state, 
which guarantees that the utility will make a reasonable return on its 
investment and that such return includes private opportunity costs.432 This 
argument can be attacked on two grounds. First, it is hardly clear that such 
contract ever existed. Further, even if it did, there is no reason to think that 
it would guarantee private opportunity costs. 
Sidak and Spulber claim that the contract exists by implication and 
that it emerges like the English Constitution from the history of practice 
and the entire corpus of utility regulation.433 This notion has received 
Support: Standing In the Shadows oj Giants: The Role oj Intergenerational Equity In 
Telecommunications ReJorm, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925 (2000). 
428. Economides also has stated: 
Although [ECPR] has been debated for the last 18 years, neither its creators nor 
its present supporters have ever provided a prooJ that the use of either of these 
two rules maximizes social surplus, and thereby deserve to be called 
"efficient." ... In fact Economides and White (1995) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1994) have proved the general inefficiency of the ECPR rule. 
Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency oj the M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 142-43; see also 
CABRAL, supra note 194, at 82 ("although the ECPR implies productive efficiency, it has not 
bite with respect to price levels. In fact, prices are set at the same level as those in an 
unrestricted monopoly."). 
429. Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency oJthe M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 140-51; 
Economides & White, supra note 419, at 560. 
430. Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency oJthe M-ECPR, supra note 419, at 140-51. 
431. E.g.,Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 13, at 855-68. 
432. Id. at 857, 864. 
433. Id. at 887-88. 
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critical attention.434 For instance, Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading antitrust 
scholar and economic historian, writes: 
The existence of any such contract imposing an obligation of 
compensation upon governments is controversial. Some scholars 
make the important argument that no compensation is due 
because there is no regulatory contract at all-indeed, that the 
entire concept of a regulatory contract is a relatively recent 
invention, developed at the behest of the utilities themselves to 
justify compensation awards that a competitive firm could never 
expect for its own improvident investments.435 
As a legal matter, even if there were such a contract, it would be read 
narrowly against the utility: 
[The Supreme Court has been clear, since the Charles River 
Bridge case, that] grants from the state must be explicit and 
narrowly construed.... it is so unmistakable that it must be 
regarded as a part of the rational expectations of any 
knowledgeable public utility investor. Literally dozens of times, 
throughout both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Supreme Court has reiterated and consistently adhered to the 
Charles River Bridge prescription that contracts with the 
government are to be strictly construed against the grantee. In 
fact, the Court has often gone further, insisting that one cannot 
read "implications and presumptions" into the state's promises, 
that regulatory promises from the state are to be given the 
"narrowest rational reading," and that claimed provisions in 
agreements with the state be "clearly and unequivocally 
434. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 
108 YALE L.J. 801, 808 (1999) (reviewing SIDAK & SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND 
THE REGULATORY CONTRACT, supra note 13). 
435. /d.; see also id. at 816. Hovenkamp stated: 
In sum, none of these decisions do not bear the weight that Sidak and 
Spulber attach· to them. They hardly stand for the proposition that every public 
utility enjoys the benefit of an unwritten "regulatory contract" protecting its 
investment from subsequent government decisions making that investment 
unprofitable. Rather, they stand for a proposition that is much narrower 
(particularly when one considers the sophistication of public utility managers): 
that public utility investors get from the state precisely what they are able to 
bargain for, no more and no less. 
/d. at 816; see also Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 
1540 (1999). Jim Chen puts the matter bluntly and accurately, "[a]s Jim Rossi and Herbert 
Hovenkamp have convincingly argued in separate book reviews, Deregulatory Takings [and 
the Regulatory Contract] has no real legal basis." Chen, supra, at 1540 (citing Jim Rossi, 
The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REv. 297,306-10 (1998); Hovenkamp, supra 
note 434, at 805-21). 
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expressed. ,,436 
Therefore, without express provision, it seems unlikely that the regulatory 
contract would contain a clause guaranteeing private opportunity costs. 
B. Mandatory Interconnection: Physical and Regulatory Takings 
The purpose of this Article is not to bury or to praise ECPR. Assume 
that it is legally and economically unassailable. Spulber and Yoo's analysis 
still arguably misidentifies the property rights implicated. They maintain 
that mandatory interconnection is a physical taking.437 True enough. It 
involves, usually, the collocation of switches and other equipment in 
incumbents' central offices and other facilities.438 At the very least, it 
requires that entrants' wires touch the incumbents' wires.439 Spulber and 
Y 00 then conclude that compensation is warranted automatically pursuant 
to the physical invasion per se takings doctrine, not the non-possessory 
regulatory takings test, under which economic harm is but the first step to 
establish a taking, and other tests must be met as well before compensation 
is required.44o 
This analysis incorrectly identifies the primary cost interconnection 
imposes as consisting solely of physical invasion when, in fact, as should 
be obvious, the lion's share of interconnection's cost does not involve 
physical invasion. Rather, mandatory interconnection involves the 
increased cost of handling traffic from an interconnecting carrier, which is 
not a physical taking.441 Further, the cost of physical invasion is slight, 
even trivial, because telephone wires simply do not take up very much 
room. Recall that under Loretto, on which Spulber and Y 00 rely so 
heavily, the Court remanded for calculation of damages.442 On remand, it 
was determined that the physical invasion of the cable amounted to one 
dollar.443 
436. Hovenkamp, supra note 434, at 816-17 (quoting Nat'l RR Passenger Corp. v. 
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451,466 (1985); Atl. Coast Line R.R v. 
Phillips, 332 U.S. 168,173 (1947); Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 396-97 (1944». 
437. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 943-44. 
438. [d. at 893. 
439. See Section III.B. 
440. [d. at 947-49. Spulber and Yoo state that the Supreme Court has kept these two 
doctrines separate as far as the nature of their analysis and, indeed, they appear to have done 
so. [d. However, there is no precedent, nor any logical rule, that would preclude one 
government action from affecting both a physical invasion taking and a regulatory taking. 
This Section argues that mandatory interconnection may affect both, but that the physical 
invasion taking is quite trivial. 
441. [d. at 894-95. 
442. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
443. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 431 (N.Y. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 430 2004
430 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 54:369 
Thus, to the extent there is a per se physical invasion, compensation is 
de minimis. This is readily apparent when one considers the "value" of an 
entrant's switch or wire in some incumbent's central office if such switch 
or wire could not receive or transmit messages. Would it be worth 
anything to anybody? Communications hardware that cannot be used to 
communicate is not worth much and neither is the space it occupies. The 
plaintiff in Loretto only got one dollar for the physical trespass of a wire 
and that wire trespassed the exterior of a swank Upper East Side Manhattan 
townhouse.444 One can reasonably assume that floor space costs a lot less 
in the basement of some Bell central office in suburban Podunk. 
Spulber and Y 00 implicitly concede that what is really at issue is the 
regulatory takings (not per se possessory takings) by their choice of 
compensation.445 They first suggest looking to competitive markets, e.g., 
wireless, to seek proxies or benchmarks for the "price" of 
interconnection;446 which is reasonable and more will be said about that 
below. The market, however, that they choose is the market for 
interconnected services, not floor rental in a telephone company's 
switching facilities.447 They advocate ECPR as a second choice if there 
does not exist sufficiently developed markets for access.448 This is, as 
discussed above, a technique for pricing network services, not the cost of 
floor space. In other words, ECPR measures the cost imposed on the 
incumbent's network when it interconnects or provides some sort of service 
to an entrant. There is no reason to believe that the cost of a network 
service would compensate a physical invasion. 
Spulber and Y 00' s first choice for compensation, competitive 
benchmarks, seems totally unobjectionable in theory and, if capable of 
implementation, perfectly correct.449 They point to non-regulated 
interconnection agreements, such as those between CMRS ("commercial 
mobile radio service" or, in other words, wireless phones), as a source for 
such benchmarks, and express the belief that "as wireless and other 
facilities-based competitors grow ... rates charge[s] ... for interconnection 
[between wireless competitors will continue to] emerge as a market-based 
reference point ... [that can be used to resolve] most pricing problems.,,45o 
1983). 
444. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422. 
445. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 914, 982. 
446. [d. at 918-19,921-22,970-73. 
447. [d. at 921-22, 970. 
448. [d. at 904, 993. 
449. [d. at 893. 
450. /d. at 973. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 431 2004
2004] Network Interconnection and Takings 431 
Of course, it should be pointed out that such interconnection agreements do 
not compensate merely physical trespass but the sending and receiving of 
messages. This demonstrates again that mandatory interconnection 
involves more than a mere physical taking, and that what is of real 
significance is the regulatory imposition of the duty to handle traffic from 
interconnecting carriers.451 
Further, Spulber and Y 00 admit that market-based rates have not yet 
developed.452 Most of these contracts are proprietary and, given the 
relative small number of players in the industry, it is likely that access will 
never be commoditized in the same way that wheat or gold is, so that the 
"price of access" could be readily or accurately determined.453 Further, it 
seems likely that CRMS interconnection agreements generally have no 
intercarrier payments.454 Indeed, Spulber and Y 00 fail to cite any 
examples of how CMRS providers price access, and it is difficult to see 
how a regulatory agency susceptible to capture could regularly and 
impartially review proprietary interconnection agreements.455 Finally, 
Spulber and Y 00 fail to cite the one example of a public, unregulated 
interconnection agreement, peering arrangements among Internet 
backbones, discussed above.456 Of course, peering agreements would 
suggest an intercarrier payment of zero and that is not consistent with their 
choice ofECPR as a second-best compensation rule.457 
C. ECPR: Yet Another Pigovian Intercarrier Payment 
Most fundamentally, however, Spulber and Yoo misidentify the costs 
and benefits that interconnection imposes and confers.458 As argued above, 
only the costs incremental to interconnection need be recovered to avoid a 
taking.459 ECPR, on the other hand, measures the cost of providing 
451. See id. 
452. Id. at 1019. 
453. !d. at 891. 
454. See Atkinson & Bamekov, supra note 174, at 25-26. 
455. See id. at 971-73. The FCC has trouble updating prices and costs in its TELRIC 
model, even when such prices are readily available as with telecommunications equipment 
like switches. See AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming 
FCC's determination that '" AT&T has presented no evidence to persuade us that New York 
did not conform to TELRIC principles simply because it failed to modify one input into its 
cost model.'" (quoting In re Application by Bell Atl. N.Y. for Authorization Under Section 
271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of 
New York, 15 F.C.C.R. 3953,4085 (Dec. 22,1999))). 
456. See Section II1.B. 
457. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note \3, at 994. 
458. ld.at 892. 
459. See Section II1.B. 
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network services (e.g., interconnection) and derives a per minute price for 
terminating calls on the incumbents' networks. But, it fails completely to 
recognize the benefit that incumbents receive from terminating such 
calls.46o As this Article has argued, takings law does not require the 
recovery of this cost from other carriers; rather, costs should be recovered 
from end-users. ECPR, in addition to having problems attendant to other 
Pigovian intercarrier payments, simply recovers the wrong costs from the 
wrong parties.461 
V. THE ONCE AND FUTURE TAKINGS TEST: HOPE NATURAL GAS 
This Article has mentioned the regulated utilities takings cases only 
briefly.462 They state, as first set forth in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal 
Power Commission, the constitutional requirements for rate setting for 
regulated utilities.463 Hope Natural Gas states that a rate cannot be so low 
as to prevent a reasonable return, as expected in the industry, on a prudent 
investment.464 The subject of this Article has been takings of carriers' 
property in deregulated environments, but the rule these cases set down465 
is consistent with the thesis herein proposed. The quasi-Coasian 
interconnection regimes impose costs on networks, but these costs are in 
proportion to the benefits larger networks confer; the greater value of a 
larger calling universe.466 The quasi-Coasian regimes require networks to 
recover their costs, including the costs of interconnection from end-
users.467 Thus, in the end, Coasian interconnection requires end-users to 
pay more, but they receive more in return.468 Following Hope Natural 
Gas, the test should be whether a carrier can expect to be reasonably 
expected to recover the imposed cost given its network's increased 
value.469 If costs are distributed in a manner consistent with the rules of 
460. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, at 904. 
461. See id. at 906. 
462. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 13, 
at 912-13. 
463. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 196 F.2d 803, 805-06 (4th Cir. 
1952). 
464. [d. at 809. 
465. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
466. See supra Section.I1LB. 
467. [d. 
468. [d. 
469. See Chen, supra note 435, at 1558-59. Chen has convincingly argued that ECPR 
represents a step back to the discredited view of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 
(1898), that ratemaking must recover "fair value," a view that Hope Natural Gas, 196 F.2d 
at 809, discredited. [d. In contrast, Coasian approaches to interconnection are very much in 
the mainstream precedent of Hope. Compare supra Section I1I.B. with Hope Natural Gas 
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thumb discussed above, regulators can presume that carriers will obtain 
sufficient revenue to cover the costs of interconnection and no taking 
results. 
Co., 196 F.2d at 806-09. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 434 2004
* * * 
